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1. EVIDENCE FOR USE 
 
Nancy Cartwright 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Everywhere we hear the call for evidence-based policy. But what is evidence for 
evidence-based policy? Theories of evidence in philosophy of science have two failings 
when it comes to answering this question. First, most pure scientific disciplines have 
fairly well understood methodologies that dictate what counts as acceptable evidence and 
most of our philosophical accounts of evidence are based on studies of these methods 
within the sciences. But policy, like other areas outside 'pure' science, raises problems 
that generally do not fit neatly with any one or another of these methodologies and our 
philosophical theories of evidence  are concomitantly ill equipped to discuss evidence 
here. Second, many of our theories are based on knowledge of probabilistic relations 
involving evidence and hypothesis (like likelihoods or relevance relations). But this puts 
the cart before the horse. Policy needs an account of what constitutes evidence to use as a 
guide for how to set or estimate these probabilities in the first place. Alternative accounts 
based on explanatory connections are also often of little concrete help because they don't 
offer practicable advice about how to tell if there is an explanatory connection. This 
paper will discuss these problems and make a plea for a theory of evidence that is at once 
philosophically principled and practicable. 
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2. TWO TRADITIONS IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 
 
Mieke Boon 
University of Twente 
 
Current laboratory sciences have emerged from two scientific traditions. Kuhn (1976, 
1977) describes mathematical and experimental traditions which have developed 
distinctly from one another. The mathematical approach arose in the Hellenistic world in 
the fifth century B.C. Classical mathematics was dominated by geometry, and was 
conceived as the science of real physical quantities, especially spatial. The experimental 
tradition arose in the seventeenth century, with fields such as electricity and magnetism, 
heat, and chemistry. In this tradition—often referred to as the Baconian tradition, after 
Francis Bacon—experiments were performed in order to see how nature would behave 
under previously unobserved, or previously nonexistent, circumstances.  
The two traditions have different metaphysical presuppositions. The metaphysical 
presuppositions of the experimental tradition are corpuscular-mechanical ideas. The 
discovery of mathematical regularities in nature has licensed a metaphysical 
interpretation as well, which is that laws of nature are the formal causes, the terminus of 
the scientific causal chain. 
The two traditions are still familiar. Most of us were introduced to physics and chemistry 
along these lines. Chemistry teaches us the corpuscular-mechanical ontology, with 
mathematics as a mere tool. Physics teaches us the laws of nature, with causal 
explanation as a heuristic tool. 
I claim that the most successful scientific practices have succeeded in integrating the two 
traditions. However, philosophical problems arise for a realist interpretation of science, in 
which they appear to be inconsistent. A more coherent and productive picture of actual 
scientific practice arises from an anti-realist picture in which the two approaches are 
interpreted as different scientific ways of structuring and interpreting the world. 
Accordingly, the mathematical approach conceptually structures the world in terms of 
mathematical patterns and aims at interpreting these patterns in terms of a small number 
of mathematical axioms or principles. The experimental approach conceptually structures 
the world as physical phenomena and aims at explaining these physical phenomena in 
corpuscular-mechanical terms. 
I count several branches in the engineering sciences as particularly successful in this 
respect. They have succeeded in integrating these two basic ways of structuring and 
interpreting the world. However, we cannot find out about this integrated approach by the 
mere study of textbooks, since one of the two approaches usually still dominates the 
topic. The problem with textbooks is that they purport to be literally true about the world, 
whereas they usually are only literally true about a phenomenon that is co-constructed in 
the scientific explanation. As a result, textbooks present theories as both true and 
explanatory; they typically do not reveal that the consequences derived from these 
theories are usually not true about the empirical facts. This is what we find out in actual 
scientific research practices. Successful scientific practices integrate the two approaches 
in order to construct scientific knowledge that actually is both explanatory and true about 
the world. 
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3. THE ABSTRACT INDIVIDUAL IN NATURE AND SOCIETY 
 
John Dupre 
University of Exeter 
 
Thinking of the biological world as composed of discrete and autonomous individuals 
seems so natural to us as hardly to demand justification, and this is even more so for the 
social world.  Yet in fact there is no unique and obvious way of dividing the biological 
world into individual organisms.  While it might be hard to imagine any alternative to the 
division of the social world into familiar human individuals, the assumption that these 
individuals, rather than more inclusive social entities, are invariably the correct location 
for agency, choice or value is certainly questionable. It seems likely that this assumption 
is reinforced by the belief that the human individual is just an instance of a much more 
general and natural division of the biological world into similarly differentiated 
individuals.  I shall suggest that the concept of the individual is, therefore, one of the 
crucial points at which partially ideologically shaped assumptions flow between biology 
and social theory. 
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4. ARTICULATING THE WORLD: EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS AND 
CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
 
Joseph Rouse  
Wesleyan University 
 
Recent philosophy of science has become increasingly disconnected from philosophical 
work in other fields: many other philosophers often rely upon implicit conceptions of 
science disconnected from actual work in the philosophy of science.  The philosophy of 
scientific practice can potentially rebuild this connection by showing how attention to 
practice can contribute to a broader philosophical understanding.  I illustrate this theme 
by showing how work on scientific practice contributes to a classic philosophical issue, 
concerning the relation between conceptual understanding and empirical engagement 
with the world.   Standard formulations ask how conceptual spontaneity is constrained at 
its boundaries by experience (or causal interaction).  I argue instead that experimental 
interaction with the world is integral to conceptual articulation in scientific practice, 
giving special attention to how new domains of scientific understanding are opened to 
conceptual understanding.  Recognizing how experimental work and conceptual 
articulation are intertwined has significant implications for philosophy of language and 
mind more generally. 
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5. THE PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR OF SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 
 
Hasok Chang 
University College London 
 
Even those scholars who are deeply concerned about scientific practice have tended to 
use rather haphazard or limited frameworks for description and analysis.  I seek to 
provide a more considered, systematic and comprehensive template — a philosophical 
grammar of scientific practice, "grammar" as meant by the late Wittgenstein.  For this 
purpose I take and freely adapt insights from the traditions of pragmatism, operationalism 
and phenomenology, and also from some contemporary authors such as Ian Hacking, 
David Gooding and Marjorie Grene.  I begin with the recognition that all scientific work, 
including pure theorizing, consists of actions — of the physical, mental, and "paper-and-
pencil" varieties.  When we set the basic focus of study on action, to see what it is that we 
actually do in scientific work, a set of questions naturally emerge: who is doing what, 
why, and how?  More specifically, we must arrive at some coherent philosophical 
accounts of the following elements of scientific practice: (1) the agent — free, embodied, 
and constantly in second-person interactions with other agents; (2) the purposes and 
proximate aims of the agent; (3) types of activities that the agent engages in, everything 
from calculating to smelling, from glassblowing to computer simulation, from 
synthesizing specific pharmaceuticals to explaining the structure of the universe; (4) 
ontological principles necessarily presumed for the performance of particular activities; 
(5) instruments and other resources that the agent pulls together for the performance of 
each activity.  Looking ahead to further development and application of the framework 
developed here, I will finish with some illustrative contrasts between the more traditional 
descriptions of scientific practice and the kind of descriptions enabled by the proposed 
framework. 
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SYMPOSIUM 1: DOWN TO EARTH: PHILOSOPHY OF THE GEOSCIENCES  
 
Maarten G. Kleinhans 
Utrecht University 
 
Philosophical analyses of the geosciences have been quite scarce, on the one hand 
because philosophers of science deemed it a relatively uninteresting discipline, on the 
other hand because most practitioners of the geosciences have eschewed philosophy. This 
session aims to contribute to the development of a philosophy of the geosciences that is 
based on analysis of actual geoscientific practice. The focus of this session is on the 
specific nature of the methods employed in geoscientific research. In particular, we 
investigate the function and status of modelling strategies (esp. physico-mathematical and 
numerical modelling), which play a crucial role in geoscientific explanation. In addition, 
we analyse the nature of geoscientific experimentation and compare it with 
experimentation in other sciences. 
 
 
1. Computer Models and Inference to the Best Explanation in Geosciences 
 
Maarten G. Kleinhans 
Utrecht University 
Henk W. de Regt 
VU University 
 
Geosciences purport to describe and explain the (history of) inanimate processes on earth. 
Theories of geoscience are typically hypotheses about unobservable (past) events or 
generalized - but not universally valid - descriptions of contingent processes. Geosciences 
combine various forms of narrative explanation with causal explanation, and typically 
rely on Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). The narrative part of the IBE describes 
the actual sequence of events in the past ("how the phenomenon came about"), while the 
causal part refers to a common cause of several pieces of evidence. Models are essential 
in geoscientific IBE: they are invoked to test whether the common cause is not in conflict 
with the laws of physics and chemistry. 
In the present paper we investigate the role of physico-mathematical computer models in 
geoscientific explanations by focusing on models predicting behavior of sand bars near 
the coastline. During storms (large waves) these bars migrate offshore and during calm 
weather (small waves) the bars migrate onshore. The migration rate differs orders of 
magnitude between different beaches. Models are developed in order to answer two 
fundamental questions: Why do the bars exist? Why and how fast do they migrate in 
different directions in calm weather and storms? 
We analyze two papers that attempt to explain this phenomenon. The first paper (Hoefel 
& Elgar, Science, 21 March 2003) invokes a hitherto ignored and ununderstood physical 
mechanism to explain the migration of these bars. The second paper (Ruessink et al. 
forthcoming in J. Geophysical Research) shows how observed trends in data of three sites 
from different continents can be modelled by three basic and well-understood physical 
mechanisms (implemented in a numerical computer model). The trends are sensitive to 
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choices of model parameters (which are empirical parts of physical laws such as friction 
and drag coefficients) and to the specified boundary conditions. Furthermore, the precise 
values of the model parameters are site-specific and cannot be known in advance, and the 
boundary conditions, such as a time series of offshore wave height and period, have 
measurement uncertainties. Hence, the model can be optimized in various ways to 
reproduce the data by adapting the poorly constrained model parameters or boundary 
conditions, or by adding or removing a physical mechanism from the model. This 
contradicts the claims by the first paper where the uncertainty of the model parameters 
and boundary conditions have been ignored. 
The predicted phenomena are underdetermined by measurement uncertainties of model 
parameters and boundary conditions, which leaves room for different, partly incompatible 
physical explanations of the phenomena. The modeling demonstrates that the phenomena 
can in general be explained by a suite of physical mechanisms, but the precise 
contribution of each mechanism remains unconstrained. The mechanism proposed by 
Hoefel & Elgar might be important but Ruessink et al show that they have not 
demonstrated this unambiguously. In sum, the explanation of the observed phenomena - 
which physical mechanisms underly the dynamics of sand bars – is hampered by 
problems of underdetermination. 
 
 
2. Historical Contingency, Underdetermination, and Numerical Modeling 
 
Derek Turner 
Connecticut College 
 
Philosophers and logicians usually think of necessity and contingency in broadly logical 
terms.  According to the standard view, a necessary truth is a statement that is true in all 
possible worlds.  A necessary falsehood is a statement that is true in no possible world.  
And a contingent truth is a statement that is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.  
Yemima Ben-Menahem (1997) has argued that this standard way of characterizing 
necessity and contingency is not very helpful to historical researchers.  In the context of 
historical research, she thinks it is more helpful to conceive of necessity as insensitivity 
to initial conditions, and contingency as sensitivity to initial conditions.   
To borrow an example from Elliott Sober (1988), imagine a person holding a ball 
standing on the rim of a giant bowl.  When the person releases the ball, it rolls down and 
eventually comes to a rest at the center of the bowl.  The final position of the ball is 
relatively insensitive to the initial conditions. That is, it makes no difference where along 
the rim the ball is released; it will always come to rest in the same place.  The ball‘s final 
resting place is historically necessary, in Ben-Menahem‘s sense of ‗necessary‘.  This is 
also closely related to the issue of underdetermination.  Hypotheses about the point of 
release are underdetermined by the observation that the ball is resting at the center of the 
bowl. 
In this paper, I begin by presenting and defending Ben-Menahem‘s conception of 
historical necessity and contingency.  I then argue that this distinction can help us to 
understand the practice of numerical modeling in paleobiology and geology.   Although 
  17 
numerical modeling plays an important role in historical science, it cannot help 
researchers perform direct tests of claims about the past.  Modelers have to assume that 
the simulation represents past processes in the relevant ways.  Yet numerical experiments 
can be used to test ideas about the (relative) necessity/contingency of historical events 
and processes.  By conducting multiple trials while varying initial conditions, earth 
scientists can use numerical models to determine the degree of sensitivity of subsequent 
developments to those initial conditions.  For example, they might do several runs of an 
ice sheet model in order to see whether (and if so, to what degree) the extent of glaciation 
depends on initial levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This sort of 
experimentation cannot tell scientists how much carbon dioxide was in the atmosphere at 
any given time in the past; nor can it reveal the extent of glaciation at any time in the 
past.  Instead, it is (among other things) a way of studying historical contingency and 
necessity. 
Since (as I will try to show) historical necessity and epistemic underdetermination go 
hand-in-hand, numerical experiments may also help researchers to ascertain the severity 
of underdetermination problems.  For example, if a model shows that subsequent 
developments (e.g., the extent of glaciation) are insensitive to initial conditions (e.g., 
carbon dioxide levels), that means that we cannot infer the initial conditions from the 
later conditions. 
 
 
3. Experiments in the Geosciences: Caging the Phenomenon? 
 
Robert Inkpen  
University of Portsmouth 
 
Comparing the nature of experiments in the ‗hard‘ sciences and in the geosciences a 
number of important differences become clear. Hacking (1983) notes that an important 
role for experimentation is creation of phenomena. He then argues that the phenomena 
created, such as the Hall effect, does not exist outside of the confines of certain kinds of 
apparatus (Hacking, 1983, p,226). Phenomena tended to be viewed as isolated instants of 
reality. Isolation of a single phenomenon, in the sense used in ‗hard‘ sciences, is not 
necessarily a major goal in the geosciences. Geosciences are more concerned with trying 
to understanding effects rather than identification of general phenomena. Using an 
abductive approach, geoscientists are concerned with identifying plausible explanations 
for observed effects. Within the geosciences there is a general assumption that 
experimentation can aid in understanding the complexity of reality by constraining that 
reality. Phenomena and reality are not so much seen as being created more as being 
caged. Researchers tend to believe that they are simplifying reality, but not beyond the 
point where it does not produce the effect of interest. Reality performs to the 
specifications of the experimenter in the experiment, but still has an existence 
independent of the experiment. Changing the constraints, altering the cages for the 
performance, is viewed as providing new insights into how reality operates rather than 
creating something wholly new. Within the study of salt weathering, for example, a 
continual refinement of experimentation can be observed from identification of the 
  18 
potential impact of salt upon rock (e.g. Goudie, 1974; Sperling and Cooke, 1985,), to 
more complex assessments of the sensitivity of salt weathering processes to 
environmental conditions (e.g. Rodriguez-Navarro and Doehne, 1999). Exploring such 
experimental work illustrates that reality is manufactured in such experiments. In 
addition, changing the cages, does alter the type of reality manufactured making the 
assumption of a common frame of reference for experimental effects more difficult to 
sustain.  
 
Cooke, R.U. and Sperling, C.H.B. 1969. Laboratory simulation of rock weathering by salt crystallization 
and hydration processes in hot arid environments. Earth Surface Processes and Landforms, 10; 541-555. 
Goudie, A.S. 1974. Further experimental investigation of rock weathering by salt crystallization and other 
mechanical processes. Zeitschrift fur Geomorphologie, Suppl. 21; 1-12.  
Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and intervening. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
Rodriguez-Navarro, C. and Doehne, E. 1999. Salt weathering: Influence of evaporation rate, 
supersaturation and crystallization pattern. Earth Surface Processes and Landforms, 24; 191-209.
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SYMPOSIUM 2: CHALLENGING THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE IN 
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE  
 
Robyn Bluhm 
University of Western Ontario 
 
Overview: The evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement of the past decade and a half 
advanced the radical suggestion that the practice of medicine should shift from a reliance 
on authority, intuition and clinical experience to a basis in research evidence. EBM is 
widely regarded as ―the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence 
in making decisions about the care of individual patients‖ (1) and has evolved into a 
vigorous movement spanning all areas of healthcare.  At its methodological and 
epistemic core is the ‗hierarchy of evidence,‘ a pre-graded ranking of clinical 
methodologies that places the evidence produced by randomized controlled trials on top, 
while maligning non-randomized and uncontrolled methods. (2) In this session, the 
participants draw on work in philosophy of science to explore the methodological, 
theoretical and social limitations of the evidence hierarchy of EBM and consider the 
implications of these limitations for clinical practice. 
 
 1. Sackett, DL, Rosenburg, WM, Gray JA, Haynes RB, Richardson, WS. ―Evidence-based Medicine: What 
it is and what it isn‘t.‖ British Medical Journal (1996) 312: 71-72. For earlier statements, see: Evidence-
based Medicine (EBM) Working Group, ―Evidence-based Medicine: A new approach to teaching the 
practice of medicine,‖ JAMA (1992) 268 17: 2420-5, and Guyatt GH, Sackett DL, Cook DJ [Evidence-
based Medicine Working Group] ―Users‘ guides to medical literature,‖ JAMA (1993) 271: 56-63. 
2. According to standard versions of the hierarchy for medical treatments, meta-analyses of large-scale, 
double-blind randomized controlled trials (RCTs) produce the highest quality of evidence, while non-
randomized trials and observational studies produce mediocre evidence and case series, case studies and 
anecdotal evidence produce the lowest quality evidence. Oxford Centre for Evidence-based Medicine: 
http://www.cebm.net/levels_of_evidence.asp (Accessed Nov. 19, 2006). 
 
1. The Hierarchy of Evidence and Biomedical Research  
 
Robyn Bluhm 
University of Western Ontario 
 
Although in principle EBM is supposed to operate with a broad definition of evidence, on 
which ―any empirical observation about the apparent relation between events constitutes 
potential evidence,‖ (1) in practice the evidence considered by EBM comes from its 
―hierarchy of evidence.‖  This hierarchy places clinical trials, which borrow from the 
methods of epidemiology, above studies examining physiological mechanisms, and 
favours randomized over non-randomized clinical trials.  The hierarchy also ―implies a 
clear course of action for physicians addressing patient problems: they should look for 
the highest available evidence from the hierarchy.‖ (2)  In this paper, I argue that, as it 
stands, the hierarchy of evidence provides a view of medical research that will ultimately 
limit the progress that can be made in biomedical research (and thus in medical practice).  
I further suggest an alternative characterization of the relationship between different 
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types of biomedical research that (1) replaces the focus on the 
randomized/nonrandomized dichotomy in clinical research with a more nuanced 
understanding of methodological choices and (2) draws more closely on epidemiology in 
integrating population-based research with research into causal mechanisms underlying 
disease. 
 
1. Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group.  Users‘ Guide to the Medical Literature,  
2. G. Guyatt and D. Rennie (Eds.)  AMA Press, 2002., p. 6 
Ibid., p. 8 
 
 
2. The Value(s) of Objectivity in Evidence-based Medicine 
 
Kirstin Borgerson 
University of Toronto  
 
This paper investigates a central assumption underlying the hierarchy of evidence offered 
by EBM, namely that evidence derived from research methodologies ranked higher on 
the hierarchy is more objective than evidence below. Objectivity is regularly used to 
signify ―everything from empirical reliability to procedural correctness to emotional 
detachment.‖(1) Heather Douglas has recently identified eight distinct senses of 
objectivity in common use. (2) I draw upon her careful catalogue in order to characterize 
the sense(s) of objectivity implicitly and explicitly assumed by proponents of EBM in the 
design of the evidence hierarchy. I raise some concerns about the potential dangers of 
relying exclusively on these mechanisms for producing objectivity, particularly in terms 
of their inability to address the influence of unidentified social values on science. I argue 
that an over-reliance on procedural objectivity has led proponents of EBM to the false 
belief that methodology alone (narrowly construed) can secure objectivity, and also to the 
related and even more problematic belief that guidelines produced on the basis of the 
evidence hierarchy provide an objective basis for medical decisions. Finally, I draw upon 
philosopher of science Helen Longino‘s comprehensive account of contextual objectivity 
and some of the early writings from EBM proponents in order to suggest ways in which 
EBM might be improved. 
 
1. Daston, L., Galison, P., ―The Image of Objectivity,‖ Representations 40 Special Issue: Seeing Science 
(Autumn 1992): 82. 
2. Douglas, H., ―The Irreducible Complexity of Objectivity,‖ Synthese 138 (2004): 453. 
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3. Iconoclast or Creed? Objectivism, Pragmatism and Evidence-Based Medicine‟s 
Hierarchy of Evidence  
 
Maya Goldenberg 
University of Toronto 
 
Because ―evidence‖ is at issue in EBM, the movement has been largely critiqued on 
postpositivist grounds, where the critics have drawn from the work of Quine, (1) Kuhn, 
(2) or Popper (3) to demonstrate the untenability of the objectivist account of evidence 
underscoring the evidence- based approach.   While these post-positivist critiques seem 
largely correct to me, I propose that the critics miss important and desirable pragmatic 
features of the evidence-based decision making technology.  I redirect critical attention 
toward EBM‘s rigid hierarchy of evidence as the culprit of its objectionable epistemic 
practices.  Reframing the EBM discourse in light of a distinction between objectivist and 
pragmatic epistemology will allow for a more nuanced analysis of EBM than previously 
offered: one that is not ―either/or‖ in its evaluation of the decisionmaking technology as 
either iconoclastic or creedal.   
 
 
1. Djulbegovic, B. ―Evidence and Decision Making: Commentary on M. R. Tonelli (2006).‖ Journal of 
Evaluation in Clinical Practice 12 (2006): 248-256.  
2. Harari, E. ―Whose Evidence? Lessons from the Philosophy of Science and the Epistemology of 
Medicine.‖ Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 35 (2001): 724-730. 
3. Shahar, E. ―A Popperian Perspective of the Term ―Evidence-Based Medicine.‖ Journal of Evaluation in 
Clinical Practice 3 (1997): 109-116. 
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SYMPOSIUM 3: THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF THE „PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
IN PRACTICE‟ ON DESIGNING APPROACHES TO HIGHER SCIENCE 
EDUCATION 
 
Ismo T. Koponen 
University of Helsinki 
Agustín Adúriz-Bravo 
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
 
In higher science education (post-compulsary secondary, tertiary, college, university... 
involving students 16+ years old), including especially pre-service science teacher 
education, we detect a need to find ways to address the topics of knowledge production 
and justification in science –topics that may eloquently be called the ‗nature of science‘ 
(NOS). Recent findings in educational research concerning higher science education have 
convincingly pointed to the need to address NOS in an explicit and carefully designed 
way. This becomes of the utmost importance in the case of science teacher education, 
since it has been shown that teachers‘ deficient and incomplete NOS views reflect 
unfavourably in science education at school in all the educational levels. 
Current literature in didactics of science (i.e., science education) and in higher education 
has, however, been narrow and limited in scope when it comes to the philosophical 
underpinnings of knowledge production and justification that are suggested for teaching 
purposes. Research in these fields, we think, would enormously benefit from a 
philosophical orientation firmly rooted in an examination of the practices of science; we 
are talking, then, of a naturalised approach to NOS. One key thing that needs to be 
discussed in higher education are the ‗as authentic as possible‘ views on the nature of 
scientific knowledge, methods, validity and evolution. Towards this direction, the 
philosophies of science that pay attention to how science actually functions give an 
excellent starting point and bears promises in our field of work. 
In this symposium, different aspects related to connecting science, didactics of science 
and the philosophy of science for a more authentic science education are discussed. As 
we have said, the main focus is on didactical research with the aim of laying 
epistemological foundation that permit to improve higher science education (with strong 
references to science teacher education). In the contributions, the theme of modelling is 
in focus, since, in recent developments in science education, theoretical models have 
been acknowledged to play a central role. This shift towards models in policy (science 
curricula), practice (science teaching) and reflection (didactics of science) of course 
mirrors the momentum that model-based views are gaining in recent philosophy of 
science. 
The five contributions to this symposium are connected by two conceptual and discursive 
threads: 1. all of us authors are engaged in teaching the philosophy of science to non-
philosophers, since we deal with the introduction of NOS in our educational practices 
having as audience students and teachers; 2. we all recognise the need to turn to recent 
and contemporary philosophies of science for our proposals, being especially interested 
in the cognitive turn, the semantic view and model-based approaches. 
  23 
1. Using Recent Philosophical Views on Science Practice to Design More „Authentic‟ 
Science Education: The Model-Based View 
 
Ismo T. Koponen 
University of Helsinki 
Agustín Adúriz-Bravo 
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
 
Background. In science education, the idea of resorting to the history and philosophy of 
science (HPS) in supporting the construction of ‗solutions‘ to didactical problems is a 
traditionally acknowledged and appreciated stance, already put forward by eminent 
scientists/philosophers such as Ernst Mach and Pierre Duhem. Today, ‗HPS‘ is a fast-
growing research area within didactics of science dealing with the contributions of the 
meta-sciences to science education in its different aspects: didactical research, 
curriculum- and unit-design, production of materials and teaching strategies, teacher 
education (McComas, 1998). 
Focus. HPS has drawn attention to the need of developing a more ‗authentic‘ science 
education, i.e. a school scientific activity that, on the epistemological level, would share 
as much as possible with science practices in the academia. The nature of science, 
especially the ‗praxiological‘ aspect of natural sciences, may illuminate science teaching 
practices. Therefore, HPS should be a component of pre- and in-service science teacher 
education. However, it should be noted that, in designing suitable solutions for science 
education, science practices cannot be transferred as such for teaching purposes; instead, 
didactical transpositions are needed (Izquierdo & Adúriz-Bravo, 2003). 
Working hypotheses. 1. The nature of science (NOS) is not only a worthwhile source of 
contents to be taught in science education; its study also provides ‗hints‘ on how to teach 
science and enact more authentic practices at all educational levels. In particular, HPS 
helps in finding didactical approaches to make the ‗modelling‘ aspect of physics more 
meaningful for students. 2. Didactics of science has extensively resorted to the new 
philosophy of science of the 1950s, 60s and 70s for NOS insights along the line of what 
constitutes the scientific method to be transferred to educational practices. More recent 
philosophical approaches (namely, the cognitive turn, the semantic view, the model-
based approach) can provide very powerful intellectual tools for a more authentic science 
education. In particular, we are interested in authors such as Ronald Giere (1988), Javier 
Echeverría (1995), Ian Hacking (1983) and others for their contribution to the 
understanding of different key aspects (semantic, praxiological, rhethorical, 
axiological...) of modelling processes in science. 
Theoretical proposal. In this presentation, we will develop some key aspects of what has 
begun to be known as the ‗cognitive model of school science‘ (Izquierdo & Adúriz-
Bravo, 2003), especially focussing on experimental intervention and on the construction 
of evidence in science practices, which we consider to be two of the main 
epistemological features of modelling. 
Practical proposals. Our theoretical approach has led us to designing several 
‗interventions‘, especially at the level of pre-service science teacher education, which 
will be briefly mentioned here and shall be object of other specific communications. 
 
Echeverría, J. (1995). Filosofía de la ciencia. Madrid: Akal. 
Giere, R. (1988). Explaining science. A cognitive approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening. Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. 
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Izquierdo, M. & Adúriz-Bravo, A. (2003). Epistemological foundations of school science. Science & 
Education, 12(1), 27-43. 
McComas, W. (ed.) (1998). The nature of science in science education. Rationales and strategies. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
 
2. Models and Modelling in Physics and Physics Education: Philosophical 
Underpinnings and Suggestions for Revisions 
 
Ismo T. Koponen 
University of Helsinki 
Agustín Adúriz-Bravo 
Universidad de Buenos Aires
 
Science education research, which sets as one of its main goals the elucidation of an 
‗authentic‘ picture of science in order to transpose it for educational purposes, has gained 
much insight from model-based views on science, where models and modelling are 
considered to play the central role in the formation, justification, systematisation and 
communication of knowledge. Within this view, a question of the utmost importance for 
science education purposes is how models make a connection with the real world. Such 
question has been previously discussed under the philosophical lense of scientific 
realism, a choice that is often preferred on the basis of the opinion that most practising 
scientist tend to adopt a realist stance (Grandy, 2003). 
On the other hand, the emerging model-based view of science education, which strives 
for ‗authenticity‘ in science teaching practices, is currently seeking support from 
philosophical positions related to the Semantic View of Theories (SVT). These recent 
advances are promising steps towards establishing a robust and coherent philosophical 
framework, and are promising candidates for a philosophical background for science 
education. However, we think that, at least in the case of physics education, a too direct 
realist conception of models, as well as the SVT itself, need some revision for the 
following reasons (Koponen, in press): firstly, the SVT is still too limited to acknowledge 
the required ‗semi-autonomy‘ of models from theories; and secondly, the SVT does not 
give a completely adequate picture of how the relation between models and the 
experimentally accessible phenomena to be modelled is bi-directional: phenomena are 
not only abstracted (modelled) but also ‗fitted‘ into models, and this is done through 
designing laboratory experiments, which isolate the phenomena of interest. Design of 
experiments and isolation of phenomena are heavily theory-guided and involve elaborate 
modelling tools. 
It is suggested here that, in physics education, attention needs to be drawn to the notion of 
the empirical reliability of models and modelling, and to the methodological question of 
how empirical reliability is established in the process of making a match between theory 
and experiment. The suggested picture –intended for the purposes of physics teacher 
education– replaces the current, more limited philosophical frameworks used in science 
education with one of a wider scope. Moreover, this ‗revised‘ philosophical background 
gives a more ‗authentic‘ picture of the working of physics as a science, and of how 
modelling activities are conducted, than other current stances in science education. Such 
framework may also bring nearer the views of instrumentalism and moderate realism, 
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which perhaps would both be needed to capture philosophical nuances in the practice of 
science education. 
 
Grandy, R.E. (2003). What Are Models and Why Do We Need Them? Science & Education, 12, 773–777. 
Koponen, I.T. (in press). Models and Modelling in Physics Education: A Critical Re-analysis of 
Philosophical Underpinnings and Suggestions for Revisions. Science & Education. 
 
 
3. Findings on practicing physicists‟ use of analogy will help science educators train 
students to think scientifically 
 
Ciara A. Muldoon 
University of Bath 
 
As Nancy Nersessian remarks: ―we will be more successful at training students to think 
scientifically if they are taught, explicitly, how to engage in the modelling practices of 
those with expertise in physics.‖ This paper presents empirical data on practicing 
physicists‘ use of analogy to conceptualise and communicate physics. It focuses on the 
different forms of analogy used by physicists in different contexts. The data stems from 
on an on-line questionnaire on visualisation, analogy and computer simulations in 
physics; follow-up e-mails with a select sample of respondents; observation of public 
lectures, and interviews with two prize-winning physicists.  
The findings show that analogical reasoning is an important model-based reasoning 
technique used by many physicists to explore new ideas and to bridge conceptual divides 
between, experts and novices, scientists from different disciplines, and specialists within 
the physics community. Formal, mathematical analogies are frequently employed in 
theory building and when communicating with experts, as the analogies hold for a 
hierarchy of relations. Playful analogies with physical and/or pictorial features are often 
used by physicists to informally communicate novel ideas to colleagues, funding bodies, 
students or the public.  
The pedagogic value of analogical reasoning allows physicists to explain the unfamiliar 
in terms of the familiar. Unfortunately, this familiarization is both a strength and 
weakness, since misunderstandings caused by inappropriate use of analogy are often 
difficult to oust. Use of analogy should not be outlawed, but physics teachers, like 
practicing physicists, need to maintain a deliberate, structured approach to the use of 
analogies, to minimise naive interpretations. I will present an example of a playful but 
well thought out analogy which has features which may make it very useful in an 
educational context. For example, it is amusing, follows an easily visualised narrative, 
contains little literal similarity but holds for a whole series of relations between the 
source and target domains.  
I believe that an editable, searchable, online database containing these kinds of playful 
but well-structured analogies (and also clearly identifies the limitations of the analogies) 
would be a useful educational resource. Compiling such a database would ideally involve 
collaboration among creative practicing physicists, science teachers, cognitive scientists, 
historians and philosophers of science, and science studies researchers. Analogy might be 
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a double-edged sword, but when wielded in a balanced, coordinated way, it can open up 
exciting new vistas. 
 
Nersessian, N.J. (1995), ―Should physicists preach what they practice? Constructive modelling in doing 
and learning physics.‖ Science & Education 4:203-226,  pp. 204 – 205. 
 
 
4. Values and Science: Enhancing Science Education Through a Philosophical 
Stance 
 
Agustín Adúriz-Bravo 
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
 
Ana C. Couló 
Universidad de Buenos Aires 
There is growing consensus among science teachers, teacher trainers, researchers, 
curriculum designers and educational policy makers on the significant role of the 
philosophy of science (together with the history and sociology of science) in improving 
the teaching of science both to students that will go on further science studies, and to 
students for whom school science is their only access to scientific literacy. The reasons of 
such significance may lie on different dimensions: the philosophy of science serves 
intrinsic aims (it provides conceptual elements leading to a better appraisal of the 
contribution of science to human culture and to a critical assessment of its nature), 
cultural aims (it constitutes a valuable intellectual creation and contributes to the 
formation of educated citizens), and instrumental aims (it aids science teaching and 
learning, for instance, by identifying obstacles to the development of scientific 
knowledge both in individuals and in society) (Adúriz-Bravo et al., 2003). 
Once the relevance of the philosophy of science to science teaching is admitted, we can 
discuss what issues of the nature of science (NOS) are useful for the aims above. Among 
such issues, the role of values and judgement in the work of scientists has been long 
debated. For instance, we can discuss whether the acceptance or rejection of scientific 
constructions is bound by logical, rule-driven inferences or whether it resembles value 
judgements. Also, whether epistemic values should be considered first or only in such 
judgements, or whether, on the contrary, non-epistemic values play a considerable role in 
scientific evaluation of theories. 
Some philosophers, usually from a normative standpoint, claim that epistemic values –
truth, coherence, simplicity, predictive fertility…– should be deemed more relevant than, 
or even displace, other values –moral, religious, cultural, aesthetic, not to mention 
personal (Laudan, 1984). From a different viewpoint, non-epistemic values may be seen 
as an inevitable and not necessarily ‗illegitimate‘ component when producing and 
evaluating scientific theories (Echeverría, 1998; Longino, 1990). 
On the other hand, non-epistemic questions should gain a place in science classrooms. 
The so called ‗externalist‘ perspective emphasises the ethical, social and political 
responsibilities of science and scientists, and deals with issues that are sometimes raised 
by students (questions about genetics, greenhouse effect, nuclear energy, biological and 
nuclear warfare, and so on) and that are now being the object of epistemological and 
axiological reflection in philosophical debates.We have taken into consideration some of 
the abovementioned questions for designing classroom and distance-learning activities in 
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science teaching. We will present and analyse some of such activities that are being 
implemented in science teaching and science teacher education in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. 
 
Adúriz-Bravo, A., Couló, A., Kriner, A., Meinardi, E., Revel Chion, A. and Valli, R. (2003). Three aspects 
when teaching the philosophy of science to science teachers. Programme & Abstracts of the 2003 ESERA 
Conference, 73. Noordwijkerhout: ESERA. 
Echeverría, J. (1998). Filosofía de la ciencia. Madrid: Akal. 
Laudan, L. (1984). Science and values. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Longino, H. (1990). Science as social knowledge. Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
 
5. Ethics in Chemistry Education for Future Scientists 
 
Veli-Matti Vesterinen 
University of Helsinki 
 
Maija Aksela 
University of Helsinki 
Over the past few years, there has been a growing interest in practical ethics, particularly 
in the societal and environmental risks of nano- and biotechnology. However, as the main 
focus of the public conversation has been on nano- and bioethics, there is a risk that the 
important ethical issues of other areas of scientific research haven't had enough attention. 
The ethical issues concerning the development of novel technologies (e.g. 
nanotechnology) are not necessary as novel as usually thought or limited to only certain 
recent areas of research (MacDonald 2004). Chemistry is a science that is produces 
applications and has potential to change the world around us. Therefore the societal and 
environmental issues related to creating novel technologies are of utmost ethical concern 
for research in chemistry.  
Recent research in the ethics of chemistry has shown that there is a need to address the 
professional ethics of chemistry in university education (Coppola 2000, Kovac 2000). 
Professional ethics refers to the formal and informal codes of conduct adhered to by the 
members of the particular profession. As members of a profession, chemists have 
responsibilities to both their peers and to society as large. As chemistry is closely related 
to many societal and environmental issues, there is often a need for chemists to be able to 
discuss the ethical issues related to their work, not only with their peers, but also with the 
general public. 
This study discusses the Finnish chemists' competency to address the ethical issues 
related to their work. Based on the results, suggestions are made on how to integrate 
ethics into Finnish university chemistry curricula. In the focus of this study are graduate 
students, who are just beginning their professional careers as chemists. The graduate 
students of chemistry and applied chemistry in five Finnish universities are asked to 
describe the societal impact and importance that their research might have, and the ethical 
concerns they have had to take into consideration in their research. The views presented 
in the answers are organized into categories and subcategories, and related to the ideas 
presented in the research of the ethics of chemistry. On the basis of comparison between 
the views expressed in answers and the views presented in the research, possible 
implications for Finnish university education are discussed. 
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The views are organized into internal and external responsibilities. Areas of concern on 
internal responsibilities include problems with authorship and problems connected with 
the design, execution and reporting of the experiment. Areas of concern on external 
responsibilities include divided loyalties resulting from non-public funding and 
anticipating the environmental and societal consequences of the research. As a conclusion 
of the study it is suggested, that there is a need for graduate courses where both the 
external and internal responsibilities are discussed explicitly. 
 
MacDonald, C.: 2004, Nanotech is Novel; the Ethical Issues Are Not. The Scientist, 18(3), 8. 
Coppola, B. P.:2000, Targeting Entry Points for Ethics in Chemistry Teaching and Learning. Journal of 
Chemical Education 77, 1506–1511. 
Kovac, J.:2000, Professionalism and Ethics in Chemistry. Foundations of Chemistry, 2, 207–209. 
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SYMPOSIUM 4: HOW DO PRACTICES MOVE KNOWLEDGE AROUND? 
INSIGHTS FROM „FACTS‟ TRAVELLING ACROSS DISCIPLINARY DOMAINS 
 
Rachel Ankeny  
University of Adelaide 
Martina Merz 
Universität Luzurn 
 
Studies of the technical, material, tacit and collaborative aspects of doing science have 
enriched our understanding of scientific practice. Reconstructing knowledge production 
procedures and capturing them in vivid descriptions, however, leaves often aside the 
constraining or restricting role of disciplinarity that affects the ways in which knowledge 
can be translated, replicated or understood. In this session, our main focus is to explore 
the ways in which practices move, transmit and circulate knowledge and to elaborate an 
approach which acknowledges the epistemological challenge of integrating knowledge 
across domains of research. Instead of emphasising disciplinary integration and 
differentiation, boundary construction and transgression, we ask what kind of methods, 
tools and forms of interaction facilitate or prevent the movements of factual knowledge 
across domains of research.  
 
More precisely, in this session, we focus on the ways in which scientific practices 
grounded in the material and instrumental settings help to assimilate new ‗facts‘ that are 
produced within a different domain. Through the analysis of cases from psychology, 
model organism research in molecular biology and epidemiological modelling, we argue 
that in order to understand the transmission of factual knowledge across domains, we 
need to identify the ways in which experimental and technical standards control and limit 
this process. Furthermore we consider the implications of these limitations for the 
integration of knowledge. 
 
1. Psychologies of Crowding: Experimental Practice and Environmental Design 
 
Edmund Ramsden 
London School of Economics 
 
Building upon studies of density and behaviour in ecology, the problem of stress from 
crowding has proven a popular subject of discussion and analysis in the social and 
medical sciences and the design professions. Most notable were a series of experiments 
on rats and mice carried out by the comparative psychologist John B. Calhoun, employed 
at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). In 1962, Calhoun identified a series of 
―social pathologies‖ that resulted from increased population density, such as violence, 
autism and sexual deviance. The aim of this paper is establish how, and how well, facts 
of crowding pathology, generated in the rodent laboratories of NIMH, travelled to an 
alternative experimental setting, the cities and institutions of the social and environmental 
psychologist.  
 
In so doing, the paper will assess the role of experimental tools, standards and practices 
in determining the transfer of knowledge and degree of collaboration between disciplines. 
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Indeed, in seeking to test Calhoun‘s findings on human beings, social psychologists were 
faced with obvious ethical and practical restrictions. They therefore sought alternative 
approaches, either through short-term experiments with individuals in crowded situations, 
such elevators, waiting rooms, or shopping trips, or through analysing the effects of 
social density in restricted institutional settings, such as the prison. Just as in Calhoun‘s 
rodent studies, experimental practice and design determined results. For those concerned 
with the development of a new field of environmental psychology, focused upon the 
broader questions of social interaction in the urban environment, evidence of social 
pathology was carefully contextualised and restricted, and thus, comparisons between 
animals and man clearly delineated. For many concerned with institutional reform, 
however, evidence of the deleterious consequences of treating human beings as ―caged 
animals‖, were analogous to Calhoun‘s pathological rodents. 
 
2. Evidence, Facts and the Database Revolution in Biology 
 
Sabina Leonelli 
London School of Economics 
 
Contemporary experimental biology is characterised by an overproduction of data about 
virtually every aspect of the most popular model organisms. The model plant Arabidopsis 
thaliana alone attracts the attention of over 16.000 researchers around the globe, working 
on fields as different as physiology, genetics, ecology and cell biology. The data thus 
accumulated are brought together, organised and circulated with the help of digital 
databases, which are becoming crucial tools towards integrating knowledge produced by 
different branches of biology. This paper explores the travels of data (1) from the 
laboratory in which it is acquired to the databases where it is stored and (2) from the 
databases to their users, i.e. biologists who need that information for their own research. 
My interest lies in how the treatment of data within these settings affects their epistemic 
value as evidence for specific factual claims about the biology of organisms. 
 
I examine the processes through which data originally produced in one laboratory is 
selected, manipulated and visualised to fit standards and ways of understanding 
characterising other research contexts. The acceptance of factual claims across different 
branches of biology depends on the way in which evidence for those claims is 
transformed to fit the standards adopted in each field. Database curators need to make 
data accessible to biologists employing practices and goals that differ considerably from 
the practices and goals characterising the setting where the data was originally produced. 
Databases enable data generated as evidence for a specific claim to become available to 
biologists with varying research interests, hence allowing researchers to assess the 
relevance of those same data to supporting other facts. Indeed, the transformation of data 
to fit database standards often results in an increase of the facts about organisms for 
which data are taken to provide evidential support. This arguably points to the emerging 
role of databases not only as tools for dissemination of data, but also as means to increase 
the evidential import of given sets of data, thus potentially creating new biological 
knowledge.  
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3. The Brokers, the Conformists and the Stubborn: the “Travellers” Crossing 
Disciplinary Divides in Modelled Environments 
 
Erika Mattila 
London School of Economics 
 
Production of new, interdisciplinary knowledge, especially in technically demanding 
modelling environment, requires adoption of knowledge from different, collaborating 
fields. To achieve this kind of cross-fertilisation is not, however, a simple or straight-
forward process. This study explores the interdependence of technical artefacts, visual 
representations, computational algorithms and research questions embedded in modelling 
practice and related to the networks of expertise and collaboration. This interdependence 
allows us to examine in detail the ways in which research groups with different 
disciplinary backgrounds actually adopt, produce and apply factual knowledge. The 
perspective taken in this study is that of a ‗fact‘. More precisely, the focus is on the ways 
in which ‗facts‘, which were produced in a long-term, interdisciplinary modelling 
practice and resulted in a set of infectious disease models for public health purposes, 
become accepted, acknowledged, or, perhaps, ignored by collaborative partners or in 
broader disciplinary contexts. 
Once we observe the ways in which ‗facts‘ travel across the different domains in the 
cross-fertilisation processes, we may sharpen our focus onto the processes of integration 
and disintegration of knowledge. Why some ‗facts‘ become unquestionably part of the 
‗canon‘, the specific way in which questions concerning disease transmission or data 
augmentation are presented? Could we characterise the various roles ‗facts‘ are given 
during building and application of models? To address these questions, this study traces 
the research problems, techniques, data, and computational algorithms that enhance or 
prevent the ‗spread of facts‘ across heterogeneous modelling practices within research 
groups based in Finland and the UK. This study is based on three types of data: long-term 
ethnographic research on infectious disease modelling, analysis of published documents 
and articles and interviews with members of collaborative network engaged in 
epidemiological or statistical modelling. 
The key findings suggest that some ‗facts‘ reported, for example, in a statistical context 
may become accepted as epidemiological ‗facts‘ that actually link the documented model 
with the broader disciplinary tradition. Hence, these ‗facts‘ may be seen as ‗conformists‘ 
that became acclimatised in the new domain or as ‗brokers‘ that try to facilitate the cross-
fertilisation process between the domains. Moreover, ‗simulated facts‘ (i.e. those 
produced by a simulation model) may gain credibility when are used in other models by 
anchoring the stories told by these models into disciplinary contexts. Interestingly though 
some ‗facts‘ seem to behave ―stubbornly‖ and require auxiliary concepts in order to 
become domesticated in the models. A typical example of a ‗stubborn fact‘ is actually 
‗disease transmission‘, which needs to be addressed through the simplified transmission 
mechanisms that allow it to be expressed in mathematical algorithms. These findings, 
hence, give us a new insight into the epistemologically challenging level of 
interdisciplinarity by tracing the possible patterns of integration or disintegration of 
knowledge and by showing how the relation of disciplines is shaped during this process. 
  32 
SYMPOSIUM 5: HOOKING UP MODELS TO THE WORLD 
 
Uskali Mäki  
Academy of Finland 
 
Aki Lehtinen 
University of Helsinki 
The session seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature on scientific models by 
examining and developing contemporary accounts of economic models. The four papers 
intended for the session all deal with the broad and complex issue of how theoretical 
models in economics are connected with real world economies by practicing economists. 
These links have various kinds of ontological, semantic, epistemological, 
methodological, and pragmatic aspects. Taken together, the four papers will cover all 
these aspects. What the papers share is that they are motivated and inspired by Robert 
Sugden‘s account of theoretical models as credible worlds as well as by the idea that 
models isolate important aspects of their targets, such as capacities and causal 
mechanisms. Among the key issues and concepts, the papers analyse and discuss the 
notions of representation, isolation, unrealistic assumptions, credibility, robustness, and 
learning.   
 
 
1. Economic models as representations, isolations, and credible worlds 
 
Uskali Mäki 
Academy of Finland 
 
In his celebrated ―Credible worlds‖ Robert Sugden contrasts his account of theoretical 
models in economics with those of Dan Hausman and myself. Since the first appearance 
of Sugden‘s paper at a conference in 1997, I have failed to see the contrast between his 
and my account as stark, or even as existing at all. The paper will outline my own current 
understanding of models and show how it accommodates many of Sugden‘s most 
valuable insights.  
 
I take models to be representations with two aspects: the representative and resemblance 
aspects. As representatives, models serve as substitute or surrogate systems the properties 
of which are directly examined (in order to indirectly acquire information about the target 
systems in the real world). I suggest credible worlds a la Sugden are representatives in 
this sense. Theoretical models (as representatives) are also isolations employing controls 
implemented by idealising assumptions. This does not imply any incompatibility between 
the notions of models as credible worlds and models as isolations, Sugden‘s apparent 
suspicions notwithstanding. Regarding the resemblance aspect of models as 
representations, the credibility of models as credible worlds will be analysed in terms of 
similarity along ontological and epistemological dimensions. Finally, the identity of 
models (regarding their abstractness and materiality) will be discussed. Throughout, the 
examples discussed by Sugden will be used to illustrate.  
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2. Learning from Economic Models 
 
Till Grüne-Yanoff 
Royal Institute of Technology 
 
Theoretical economic models portray extremely simplified, counterfactual worlds. This 
paper discusses how we can learn from such models about the real world. As a starting 
point, I take Sugden‘s account of models as credible worlds. He argues that by judging a 
model to be credible, the causal factors described in the model are judged to be the same 
as the ones active in the real world. This, Sugden claims, allows an inductive inference 
from the model to the real world. Learning from models thus crucially depends on how 
credible one finds them. I argue that Sugden‘s notion of credibility prevents accounting 
for the most important kinds of learning from models. Judging models to be credible 
without reference to context or purpose only allows us to conclude from the credible 
model that a certain event is possible. We thus learn from the model only if we were 
confident in an impossibility hypothesis contradicting this conclusion. In contrast to this 
narrow account, I argue that we also learn from models by making credible inferences 
from them – inferences that are credible for a particular situation and a particular 
purpose. An inference from model to situation is credible if there are no reasons 
indicating that details neglected by the model matter for the situation. For this credibility 
judgment, evidence from the particular situation is required. However, we learn about the 
world from the model – the evidence is circumstantial in the sense that it only supports 
the inference. Thus, we can learn from a model about a broad spectrum of claims about a 
particular situation, if we consider the models in the light of this specific situation. This 
implies that model builders interested in what their models can teach us should focus 
more on the application of their constructions to at least some particular situation – a 
practice unfortunately rare in current mainstream economics. 
 
 
3. Unrealistic models -- credible inferences? Economic modelling in theory and 
practice 
 
Tarja Knuuttila 
University of Helsinki 
 
The most persistent philosophical problem of economics has concerned the realisticness 
of economic theories and their basic assumptions such as utility maximization, perfect 
information and the givenness of tastes. The issue has been whether such assumptions are 
too unrealistic or whether that should matter at all. Various standpoints toward the issue 
have been taken throughout the history of economics ranging from essentialist realism to 
fictionalism and instrumentalism. Recently, this issue has been addressed through 
studying how economic models give us knowledge about the economic phenomena. It 
has been suggested that economic models should be best conceived as surrogate systems, 
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through which we can get knowledge if they nevertheless succeed to isolate some causal 
mechanisms correctly (Mäki 2005) or license inductive inferences concerning their target 
phenomena (Sudgen 2002).  
 
While treating economic models as surrogate systems describing tentative causal 
mechanisms goes some way in solving the problem of their unrealisticness, it still seems 
to me that many theoretical models in economics are far too removed from the economic 
reality to be taken as realistic representations of their target systems in any relevant sense. 
What is more, there are several examples of developments in which more realistic models 
have been cast aside in favour of more unrealistic ones. Thus the question is how to 
account for this phenomenon. I will suggest that theoretical modelling in economics 
should be conceived as a specific practice guided by a certain metaphysical 
understanding of its objects (cf. Mäki 2005) and making use of available computational 
templates, modelling methods and representational means in a rather opportunistic 
fashion. From this point of view what counts in modelling are the results produced—
which results can explain some observed data but models might also be built to justify the 
modellers‘ theoretical preferences. I will also present some examples from economic 
modelling to illustrate the productive approach to models put forth.   
 
 
4. Incredible worlds and credible results 
 
Jaakko Kuorikoski 
University of Helsinki 
Aki Lehtinen 
University of Helsinki 
 
Robert Sugden offers his account of theoretical economic models as credible worlds as an 
answer to the question of how to justify the inductive leap from the world of models to 
economic reality. He also considers robustness considerations as the key justification for 
this inductive leap, but rejects this possibility since, according to Sugden, robustness 
considerations can only be about comparisons between models and thus cannot facilitate 
the inductive leap from models to reality. We argue that robustness considerations are 
inductively relevant in the sense that they are about model-world relationships; 
robustness guards against inevitable errors in model-based reasoning concerning systems 
with underlying causal heterogeneity.  
 
All economic models involve abstractions and idealisations and there is no way to 
eradicate all false assumptions from a model. Moreover, in contrast to physics for 
example, economic theory itself does not tell which idealizations are truly fatal or 
harmful for the result and which are not. This is why much of what is seen as theoretical 
contribution in economics is constituted by deriving familiar results from different 
modelling assumptions. If a modelling result is robust with respect to particular 
modelling assumptions, the empirical falsity of these particular assumptions does not 
provide grounds for criticizing the result. Thus the credibility of a result, whether it can 
be expected to correspond to a genuine economic phenomenon, can be assessed by 
comparing even incredible worlds. We demonstrate how analytic or derivational 
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robustness analysis does carry epistemic weight, and answer criticism concerning its 
allegedly non-empirical nature and the problematic form of the required independence of 
the ways of derivation. 
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SYMPOSIUM 6: STABILIZING EVIDENCE 
 
Marcel Boumans  
University of Amsterdam 
 
The proposed symposium discusses how scientists build evidence. It will be shown that 
observations are not enough. To distill evidence from observations, these have first to be 
‗stabilized‘. Stabilization strategies take different forms: it can mean stabilizing an 
environment (e.g. laboratory), stabilizing the ‗observer‘ (e.g. instrument, observatory), 
stabilizing the observations (e.g. standardization, protocol), stabilizing an audience (e.g. 
peer review), or stabilizing interpretation (e.g. pattern, theory). The three cases studies 
presented at this symposium take a specific kind of observation (microscope inspection, 
armchair observation, and statistics subsequently) as staring point and lay bare its road to 
evidence. 
 
1. Protocol, pattern and paper. Interactive stabilization of immunohistochemical 
knowledge. 
 
Hubertus Nederbragt 
Utrecht University 
 
This paper analyzes a small research project, performed to investigate the distribution of 
the extracellular matrix-protein Tenascin-C in mammary tissues of dogs. The method 
used for this investigation was immunohistochemistry of tissue slides which constitutes 
the application of an antibody to tenascin-C that specifically binds to the protein and can 
then be labelled and made visible for microscopic inspection. The first phase of the 
project is the making of the immunohistochemical protocol, the second phase is the 
deduction of a pattern of tenascin-C distribution in the tumours from the microscopical 
observations and the third phase is the writing of a manuscript for publication in a 
journal. Each of the three phases is analyzed separately, using the concept of resistance 
and accommodation, described by Pickering in his The Mangle of Practice (Princeton 
University Press, 1995). My purpose is to show that in each phase of the process of 
producing knowledge the scientist meets several resistances which force her to 
accommodate by changing her conceptual, technical and methodological approaches and 
that in the end of each phase a situation of stability of knowledge is reached. 
In the protocol phase the main interaction takes place between the scientist and the 
antibody in combination with the tissue slides. In the pattern deduction phase the scientist 
meets resistance in the pathological diagnosis of the tumours and the expectations and 
hypothesis with which she had entered the project, in the criteria to be used for assigning 
each of the slides to one of a limited number of tenascin-C patterns, and in the response 
of colleagues and supervisor who have to be convinced of the proposed pattern(s) as 
stable knowledge. In the paper writing phase the interaction is between the scientist and 
the scientific community who should accept the knowledge of the research project as 
having implications for the knowledge of the community. 
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The three phases are connected to each other in two different ways. First, when 
stabilization of knowledge is obtained in a certain phase the agents of resistance turn into 
accomplices, giving support to accommodating to the resistances in the later phase. 
Second, the stabilization of knowledge of the protocol is further enhanced when 
stabilization of the pattern is obtained, whereas the latter is more definite when it has 
become stabilized knowledge in the scientific community. 
 
 
2. The (shifting) nature of evidence in political economy 
 
Harro Maas 
University of Amsterdam 
 
This paper is concerned with the shifting nature of evidence in political economy before 
econometrics took hold. As a case study I will look at John Elliot Cairnes' The Slave 
Power of 1862 and its antipode, Ulrich Bonnell Phillips American Negro Slavery of 
1918. 
Following John Stuart Mill‘s seminal essay on the definition and method of political 
economy Victorian political economists claimed a separate mode of observation in 
economics that was nevertheless as certain as what was generically referred to as 
―experiment and observation‖ in the natural sciences. This particular mode of observation 
distinguished itself from the controlled observation in the laboratory and from the field 
observations of natural philosophers. By mid nineteenth century, the Irish political 
economist John Elliot Cairnes was the most explicit in defending the economists‘ 
privileged route to truth to both sides, experiments and natural philosophy. In his 
methodological writings Cairnes claimed that the "business of the political economist" 
was done once he had traced a phenomenon back to a mental principle. Elsewhere, he 
compared this method with that of a "comparative anatomist" who (like Cuvier) deduced 
the shape of an extinct animal from "a fragment of a tooth or bone". For Cairnes 
observation consisted in the mediation between a phenomenon and a principle of mind. 
But if this mediation was not established by means of experiments, nor by means of field 
observations, the question is ‗How was it?‘. That is: what ―bones‖ (or evidence) led to the 
motives? Put this way, the Millian method of observation found its nineteenth century 
literary equivalent in the works of Edgar Allan Poe and Arthur Conan Doyle. The first 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the fruitfulness of this literary connection in 
relation to Cairnes' Slave Power of 1862.  
In his days, Cairnes' book was generally heralded as a fine piece of inductive reasoning 
(even though he considered it a piece of deductive reasoning himself), and became the 
standard account of the American slave economy until 1918, that is until the appearance 
of Ulrich Bonnell Phillips American Negro Slavery. Phillips forcefully argued that 
Cairnes might have got to a very different image even on the basis of the evidence then 
available. The blistering attack of the historian Phillips on Cairnes' (mis-)use of statistical 
evidence definitively damaged Cairnes' reputation of having provided an accurate 
account of the American Slave South, but it raises the question what counts as credible 
  38 
evidence for a theory, and what makes criteria for evidence change over time. The 
illumination of these questions is the second purpose of my paper. 
 
3. The problem of finding evidence outside the laboratory 
 
Marcel Boumans 
University of Amsterdam 
 
Trygve Haavelmo‘s methodological manifesto The Probability Approach in 
Econometrics not only laid down the paradigm for modern econometrics, but also sets out 
the strategy for measurement in the ‗wild‘. His conceptualization of ‗passive 
observations‘ and the framing of the problems that go with them, are still very useful for 
understanding current ‗experiments outside the laboratory‘. 
Haavelmo‘s classic is very rich: it provided the framework for introducing probabilistic 
methods in econometrics and a profound discussion on invariance (‗autonomy‘). This 
latter subject is well treated by various philosophers, like N. Cartwright, K.D. Hoover, 
and J. Woodward. This does not, however, apply to the ‗problem of passive observation‘. 
It is only mentioned, if it is mentioned at all, in relation to the discussion of autonomy, 
but that is it. 
The problem of passive observation is, however, a separate problem, namely the problem 
of finding a (complete) list of all relevant causal factors outside the laboratory; that is, 
trying to pick them out when they are all working simultaneously and we cannot isolate 
them. All kinds of alternative empirical methods were suggested to find evidence outside 
the laboratory. Ragnar Frisch, one of the leading econometricians of those days, 
suggested a method to measure the strength of the causal influences and Jan Tinbergen, 
the other leading econometrician, applied this method in his paradigm-setting 
methodology of macro-econometric modeling. Haavelmo, however, showed that this 
empirical approach could lead to spurious explanations. Therefore he distinguishes 
between factual and potential influences. Factual influences are influences we observe. 
These are the causal factors that have potential influence and which vary enough to reveal 
their influence. But this does not mean that the influences we do not observe have no 
potential influence. To know which factors are causal we, as passive observers, are 
dependent on when Nature‘s willingness to show them, and this might take a long time. 
Already in Haalvelmo‘s manifesto, but more explicit Koopmans program for modern 
econometrics, it gradually became accepted that this problem could not be solved by 
empirical research alone, and that theory had a decisive role in selecting the relevant 
causal factors. 
This paper will give a reconstruction of his discussion of ‗factual‘ and ‗potential‘ 
influences, which provided Haavelmo the framework to discuss ‗Nature‘s experiments‘ 
and will allow us to discuss more generally measurement outside the laboratory. 
Moreover, it shows how Herbert Simon could develop this framework into his own 
account of causal ordering. 
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SYMPOSIUM 7: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE STUDY OF 
DISEASE AND CURE 
 
Julian Reiss  
Complutense University 
David Teira  
UNED 
 
Which biomedical problems ought to be studied? Once we know which questions to ask, 
how do we go about addressing them? The aim of this session is to shed light on these 
normative and methodological issues. The core idea underlying two of our papers (by 
Ankeny and Kerridge and by Reiss) is that biomedical research should serve the common 
good. That is, it should be practised such that the values and goals of the global 
population are addressed, including the poor, minorities and other disadvantaged groups. 
These two papers investigate specific cases demonstrating that biomedical research, in its 
currently form, is far from this ideal. One paper addresses the WHO system of classifying 
diseases, the other, the so-called neglected-disease problem. 
 
The remaining two papers (by Dehue and Teira) look at the social epistemology of 
randomised clinical trials (RCTs). RCTs are now the ―gold standard‖ for proving clinical 
efficacy in evidence-based medicine and, in fact, it is today virtually impossible to 
introduce a new drug into the market without having it tested in a large RCT. But this has 
not always been the case. Dehue‘s paper examines the background of social values that 
had to prevail in order to make RCTs socially acceptable. Teira‘s paper investigates an 
episode in the UK medical history in which methodological, social and political 
arguments competed about whether or not to introduce RCTs and shows that all three 
types of concern can be unified in a single economic model. 
 
 
1. Classifying Malignancies: The Effects of Practice on What Counts as Disease 
 
Rachel Ankeny 
University of Adelaide 
Ian Kerridge 
University of Sydney 
 
Over the past four decades there have been enormous advances in the understanding of 
the haematological and lymphoid malignancies. Identification of various types of 
differences between particular disease conditions has enabled vastly greater specificity in 
diagnosis and more accurate prognostication. In recent years, discovery of the molecular 
basis of these conditions has led to significant changes in the way they are diagnosed, 
classified, and most importantly, treated. This paper focuses on the most recent and 
widely adopted classification system for the lymphoid malignancies as proposed by the 
World Health Organization (WHO), against the backdrop of a brief history of previous 
classification systems. The development of the WHO system has been stated to be in 
accordance with the ―longstanding WHO principle that international agreement on 
criteria for the definition and classification of cancer types and a standardised 
nomenclature are prerequisites for progress in clinical oncology, multicentre trials and 
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comparative studies in different countries‖ (Jaffe et al., 2001). However while the WHO 
system appears to establish more clearly delineated disease categories in terms of 
characteristic epidemiology, aetiology, clinical features, and oftentimes distinctive 
therapeutic responses, it requires diagnostic information from techniques that are not 
widely available within the developed world and are rarely available in developing 
countries. Hence we argue that although the concepts of disease that have been created 
through this system are in some sense more fundamental or real than previous ones, they 
may fail to allow the development of diagnostic principles that are globally relevant and 
also impede comparative research and progress in the field.  
 
 
2. The Emergence of the „Control Group‟ 
 
Trudy Dehue 
University of Groningen 
 
Handbook histories present scattered examples of treatment comparison through the ages. 
One classic example is that of the eighteenth-century doctor James Lind who embarked 
on a ship to compare six scurvy treatments by giving each of them to two diseased 
sailors. Another one is that of doctor Ignaz Semmelweis who fought child-bed fever by 
comparing two maternity clinics in mid-nineteenth century Vienna. This paper, however, 
argues that only in Whig histories can such examples can be described as immature 
precursors to our present-day experiment comparing ‗true‘ experimental and control 
groups. 
Moreover, experimental comparison of groups was not an option in pre-twentiethcentury 
scholarly debates on research with human beings. John Stuart Mill‘s System of Logic 
(1843) extensively discusses the ―method of difference‖, that is comparing cases in which 
an effect does and does not occur. Yet, Mill considered this method inappropriate in 
research with human beings. And 1865, the illustrious French physiologist Claude 
Bernard published a book with the deliberately provocative title of Introduction à L'étude 
de la Médecine Expérimentale. For the sake of valid knowledge, Bernard maintained, 
―comparative experiments have to be made at the same time and on as comparable 
patients as possible‖. Nevertheless, one searches Bernard's Introduction in vain for 
comparison of experimental to control groups. As ardently as he defended 
experimentation, he rejected group comparison.  
This paper presents an explanation of why eminent nineteenth-century scholars did not 
adopt the use of control groups as a methodological condition. It argues that the 
methodological significance of such groups was inconceivable before considerable 
changes occurred in society at large. Analysing the nineteenth-century values that  
excluded comparison of artificially composed groups, helps to recognise the 
twentiethcentury values endorsing it.  
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3. Neglected Diseases and Well-Ordered Science 
 
Julian Reiss 
Complutense University 
 
The practice of the sciences is well-ordered (in Philip Kitcher‘s sense) only if inquiries 
are directed in ways that promote the common good, conceived as aiming at the goals 
that would be endorsed in a democratic deliberation among well-informed participants 
committed to engagement with the needs and aspirations of others. Whether or not this 
particular elaboration of the idea of the common good is adopted, a necessary condition 
for well-ordered science in biomedical research is that research addressed to alleviating 
the burden of suffering due to disease should accord with the ―fair-share‖ principle: at 
least insofar as disease problems are seen as comparably tractable, the proportions of 
resources assigned to different diseases should agree with the ratios of human suffering 
associated with those diseases. Thus if the disease burden associated with a form of 
respiratory infection is twice that of a specific type of cancer, and if there are approaches 
to both diseases that are roughly equally promising, then the funds assigned to the 
respiratory infection should be approximately twice those given to the cancer. 
It would be difficult to maintain that contemporary biomedical research is well-ordered in 
this sense. The global disease burden is distributed very unequally across the globe (for 
instance, between first- and third-world countries, between men and women, between 
richer and poorer strata within the same societies), and these inequalities are reflected in 
medical research and development investment: for instance, cardiovascular diseases 
receive ten times the funding of malaria per DALY lost, diabetes ten times that of 
tuberculosis. 
This paper addresses research in the context of a range of tropical diseases, remedies for 
which are extremely scarce because no markets for alleviating drugs exist: the so-called 
―neglected diseases‖. It discusses a number of solutions to the neglected-disease problem 
that have been proposed, including an income-transfer solution, a public-goods solution 
and the Biomedical Research and Development Treaty and argues that each proposal has 
a number of important shortcomings. The proposal made here focuses on the patenting 
system that prevails throughout the Western world and suggests that this system needs to 
be redrawn if biomedical research is to serve the common good. 
 
4. What Caused the Adoption of Randomised Clinical Trials in Britain? 
 
David Teira 
UNED 
 
My paper analyses the adoption of randomisation in the design of clinical trials in the 
United Kingdom at the time when the first test of the efficacy of streptomycin was 
conducted. I try to reassess this episode from the standpoint of an economic model of 
scientific behaviour. Historical accounts of the process adopt three different approaches.  
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In accordance with the testimony of the medical statisticians who promoted 
randomisation, some argue that it was adopted just for the sake of its methodological 
strength. There are those who argue that the adoption of RCTs was driven by broader 
social concerns, independently of their statistical cogency, mostly to justify the allocation 
of streptomycin to patients at a time of scarcity. It has been also argued that the 
introduction of RCTs was just a by-product of the British pharmaceutical policy in the 
inter-war period, aiming at an impartial regulation of the pharmaceutical market. 
Historians usually grant that there is a bit of truth in each of these alternatives, but their 
accounts emphasise one or another depending on their personal intuitions as to the 
motivations of the agents involved in the adoption of RCTs. Those who portray them as 
mostly epistemic agents prefer the first of the three accounts; those who view them as 
self-interested policy-makers opt for the second one and, finally, those who focus on the 
normative concerns they expressed prefer the third explanation. The underlying 
philosophical dilemma is whether we can somehow unify all these threads into a single 
model of scientific behaviour.  
My claim is that this is feasible if we construct a social epistemology of RCTs that 
articulates all these concerns. The relevant political features of randomisation, namely 
impartiality, can be captured by decision theory, if we assume that the clinicians act in 
their own interest. This is the very plausible assumption that the supporters of the second 
account favour, but it is not incompatible in principle with the motivations preferred in 
the first and the third accounts. I argue that if we adopt an economic model of scientific 
decision-making we can render these three accounts (to a certain extent) compatible. 
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SYMPOSIUM 8: SCIENCE, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND 
PSYCHOANALYSIS: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS 
 
Filip Buekens 
Tilburg University 
 
Recent debates in France and elsewhere have (once again) raised questions concerning (i) 
the status of psychoanalysis as a science and (ii) the epistemic status of psychoanalytic 
interpretations. (Meyer et.al., 2005, Buekens 2006). A careful examination of arguments 
of both Freud critics and defenders of psychoanalysis (both as science and as therapy) 
shows that both parties appeal to versions of social constructivism as a theory of science 
science and an account of scientific and therapeutic practices to make their case. The 
following options can be discerned: 
 
An account of the way genuine social facts are construed can explain how psychoanalytic 
theory has evolved and how psychoanalytic interpretations of patients and cultural 
artefacts are generated. A defence of this position is compatible with a rejection of global 
social constructivism as an account of science in general and an account of 
psychoanalysis as a circular hermeneutics. 
A social constructivist account of mental disorders explains the way psychoanalysis 
functions, thus making its potentially positive effects in therapy consistent with its 
rejection as a genuine scientific theory.  
Social constructivism qua theory of science is an indefensible account of science, but 
often appealed to by psychoanalysts as an immunisation strategy against their critics.  
 
The aim of the proposed symposium is to clarify the fascinating and often confusing 
dialectical role of issues concerning science and social constructivism in a highly debated 
area.  
 
 
1. Searle, Institutional Facts and Psychoanalysis 
 
Filip Buekens 
Tilburg University 
 
Among the many variants of social constructivist claims about science, three claims stand 
out as central. First, there is the idea that knowledge is ‗created‘, rather than found. 
Theories create their own facts – facts are social constructions (pace Boghossian 2006). 
Secondly, there is no sharp distinction between justification and acceptance. Justifications 
are social constructions and truth is what is ‗accepted by our peers‘ (Rorty). Thirdly, 
when we say that a certain description is ‗accurate‘ or ‗true‘, we are not judging it 
according to how well it depicts the world. Rather, we are saying that the words have 
come to function as ‗truth telling‘ within the rules of a particular language game – or 
more generally, according to certain conventions of certain groups (Gergen 1999).  
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I will present an account of the construction of social facts that does not support global 
social constructivism in science. Genuine social facts come into existence, are created by 
rules of the form ‗X counts as Y‘, they have a context C in which find a justification for 
their existence and they must be accepted by a community of agents to continue their 
existence (Searle 1995, Hindriks 2004). Searle does not intend his theory of social facts 
as a theory about truth, scientific theories or how scientific facts come into existence (on 
the contrary!). However, the features discerned by Searle explain remarkably well the 
way a psychoanalytic claim functions. I show how constitutive rules govern the 
introduction, invention or construction of ‗psychoanalytic facts‘ (the Oedipus complex, 
death drive, the unconscious, …). These rules have two functions: (i) They introduce an 
implicitly define psychoanalytic concepts (in the Y-position), and since they are 
declaratives that have both mind/world and world/mind direction of fit, they create the 
facts with which they correspond. (ii) The constitutive rules must be accepted by a 
community (there are no psychoanalytic facts independently from the acceptance of its 
constitutive rules by the psychoanalytic community) and (iii) the created institutional 
facts exist relative to a context in which its appliers find ample evidence for their ‗truth‘. 
This constructivist account of psychoanalysis sheds less light on why it is a 
pseudoscience, but illuminates how it functions in practice,under a description many 
psychoanalysts tend to reject.  
 
 
2. Placebo and psychoanalytic practice: a moderate social constructivist defence of 
psychoanalysis  
 
Andreas De Block 
Radboud University Nijmegen & Catholic University Leuven 
 
According to social constructivists, social constructions arise when the continuous flow 
of contingencies is stabilized by the use of generalizations and concepts. Such concepts 
are often reified: people start to think that these abstract concepts have real and tangible 
existence. Social constructivism further analyses how and why the concepts and their 
transformations influence the thinking and behaviour of individuals. Hacking‘s analyses 
of fugue (Hacking 1999) and multiple personality disorder (Hacking 1995) are based on 
social constructivist theory. He contends that mental disorders are not indifferent to 
psychiatric theories and diagnostic tools. According to Hacking, mental disorders are not 
natural (or indifferent) kinds, but what he calls ‗interactive kinds‘. Hence, what was 
known about people suffering from a mental disorder may become false because people 
of that kind have changed in virtue of how they have been classified, or because of how 
they have been treated as so classified. I will argue that the socially constructed character 
of many - if not most - mental disorders has interesting consequences for psychoanalytic 
theory:  
Because mental disorders are to a large extent ‗culture bound syndromes‘ or social 
constructions, psychoanalysis could only flourish as long as it was widely accepted 
(Borch-Jacobsen 1989).  
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Psychoanalysis does not differ substantially from other psychiatric theories. All of the 
(human) behavioural and social sciences create – at least partially – what they study. 
Obviously, in science not all is invention and nothing discovery (Bunge 1996), but all 
sciences studying interactive kinds both invent and discover.  
The effects of psychoanalytic therapy are primarily placebo (Shapiro & Morris 1978). 
But this is equally true for other psychotherapies (Frank 1961, Dongier 2001). A ‗talking 
cure‘ can only be effective if the therapist and the patient have more or less the same 
beliefs about (a) the basic psychiatric taxa, (b) the aetiology of mental disorders, and (c) 
the aim of the therapy (Torrey 1972). Hence, part of the today‘s failure of psychoanalytic 
therapy can be brought back to the public criticism of psychoanalysis, rather than to the 
justified content of that criticism.  
If psychoanalysis is nowadays considered to be a bad theory, it really is a bad theory. The 
social construction of a failure (or a success) does not make the failure (or success) any 
less real (Hacking 1999).  
 
 
3. Psychoanalysis and social constructivism: the epistemic status of a pseudoscience 
 
Maarten Boudry 
Ghent University 
 
Social constructivists assert, among other things, that there are no objective facts which 
by themselves are able to change a scientific paradigm. Golinski (2005) writes that 
"given sufficient creativity and resourcefulness on behalf of its defenders, the existing 
paradigm could be maintained indefinitely." Many philosophers and scientists regard this 
as a dubious claim if applied to science, because it takes the occasional narrowness or 
irrationality of scientists as intrinsic to the whole discipline (Holt, 2002). I will argue that 
social constructivism unintentionally offers a useful description of psychoanalysis, but 
not necessarily of every pseudoscience. The characterisation of a theory as a 
pseudoscience does not require the properties that constructivism describes. A theory is 
suitable for a constructivist description if its development is not determined by some 
objective physical reality, but is contingent upon the social and cultural predispositions of 
the theorist or the research community.   
The epistemic structure of psychoanalytic theory allows for a constructivist description of 
its functioning. Several epistemic conditions jointly make psychoanalytic interpretations 
ultimately arbitrary, and therefore susceptible to cultural and social factors for its 
continuing appeal:  
the postulate of an imperceptible realm of the mind which is called the psychodynamic 
"Unconscious"  
the attribution of certain properties to this Unconscious which reduce the chances of 
encountering falsifying material, and which concomitantly extend the means of drawing 
inferences between the source material to reach a certain conclusion or interpretation.  
the assertion that the Unconscious is illogical, irrational, and it tries to deceive us in the 
most far-fetched ways: this makes any apparent implausibility in psychoanalytic 
interpretations again consistent within the theory. 
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The deeper meaning assigned to empirical material (dreams, slips of the tongue, works of 
art, human behaviour in general) is in practice unfalsifiable, Because of these epistemic 
properties, the deeper meaning assigned to the empirical material (…) can in practice 
always be 'confirmed', and therefore psychoanalytic interpretations function as arbitrary 
decrees, which can be described accordingly (Buekens, 2005). The epistemic core of 
psychoanalysis consists in a purely formal recipe for generating confirmations in 
theorising about the human psyche. Psychoanalysis is in that sense a hollow or ―empty‖ 
theory (Borch-Jacobsen 2005). As the constructivist would say, disputes between 
rivalising psychoanalytic schools or ―paradigms‖ can never be decided on an objective 
basis, because the theory is ―flexible‖ (Golinski, 2005) enough to cope with any 
anomalies (Crews, 1998). In my contribution I will defend the following claims:  
The proliferation of social constructivist ideas in psychoanalysis seems to be a 
consequence of the constructivist internal dynamics of psychoanalysis itself, and the 
naïve extrapolation of these properties to science in general. The fact that quite a lot of 
'post-modern' psychoanalysts tend to think that the scientific theories are ‗socially 
constructed‘, maybe witnesses to the fact that this is just the kind of theory dynamics with 
which psychoanalysts are most closely acquainted.  
Although social constructivism is a suitable theory to describe the internal dynamics of 
psychoanalysis, this does not mean that it can be used legitimately as an argument to 
defend psychoanalysis against scientific and philosophical critiques. In that case the 
constructivist argument is an immunization strategy which is implicitly relativistic and 
epistemically too strong.  
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DEMARCATING MISCONDUCT FROM MISINTERPRETATIONS AND MISTAKES 
 
Hanne Andersen 
University of Aarhus 
 
Within recent years, scientific misconduct has become an increasingly important topic, 
not only in the scientific community, but in the general public as well. Spectacular cases 
have been extensively covered in the news media, such as the cases of the Korean stem 
cell researcher Hwang, the German nanoscientist Schön, or the Norwegian cancer 
researcher Sudbø. In Science's latest annual "breakthrough of the year" report from 
December 2006, the descriptions of the year's hottest breakthroughs were accompanied 
by a similar description of "the breakdown of the year: scientific fraud". 
Official guidelines for dealing with scientific misconduct were introduced in the 1990s. 
At this time, research agencies, universities and other research institutions  around the 
world developed guidelines for good scientific practice and formed committees to handle 
cases of scientific misconduct. In this process it was widely debated how to define 
scientific misconduct. Most definitions centered on falsification, fabrication, and 
plagiarism (the so-called FFP definition), but suggestions were also made for definitions 
that were broader and more open-ended, such as the 1995 suggestion from the US 
Commission of Research Integrity to replace FFP with misappropriation, interference and 
misrepresentation (the so-called MIM definition). The MIM definition was not adopted in 
the US, but MIM-like definitions have been adopted in several other countries. 
In this paper, I shall describe these MIM-related definitions of scientific misconduct and 
analyze the arguments that have been advanced in their favor. I shall discuss  some of the 
difficulties inherent in the MIM-related definitions, such as the distinction between 
misrepresentation and mistake, and the demarcation of misrepresentation in areas 
characterized by uncertainty or by diverging research paradigms. 
I shall illustrate the problems inherent in the MIM-definition through a particular case:  
the ruling of the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty (DCSD) about Bjørn 
Lomborg's best-selling book The Skeptical Environmentalist in which he argued that 
contrary to what was claimed in the ―litany‖ of the environmentalists, the state of the 
environment is getting better rather than worse. Lomborg was reported to the DCSD by 
several environmental scientists, and this controversial case from 2003 ended with a 
verdict that characterized Lomborg‘s conclusions as misrepresentations, but acquitted 
Lomborg of misconduct due to his ignorance. I shall analyze this verdict and the 
problems it reveals with respect to the MIM-related definitions of misconduct, and I shall 
briefly describe the aftermath of case, including the way in which misconduct allegations 
have since become popular in the Danish public debate on politically controversial 
research, such as intelligence research, climate research, or the history of the Cold War. 
Finally, I shall conclude the paper by returning to some of the considerations that led to 
the MIM-related definitions and discuss how to achieve their aims.
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DO TECHNOSCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS HAVE THEIR OWN LIFE? FOUR 
SCHEMES FOR THE EXPERIMENT-THEORY RELATIONSHIP 
 
Juan Bautista Bengoetxea 
Spain 
 
In order to talk about naturalism in the realm of philosophy of science, philosophers 
sometimes allude to different discourses about scientific practices. It is true that this kind 
of practices may be considered an appropriate way to detect modal expressions, 
especially that of necessity in its natural form. That is to say, these practices may show 
that the concept of natural necessity has a normative authority on what we say or make. 
What is the reference we talk about when we develop this kind of practices is not that 
clear, however. 
Scientists use to emphasize the role that experimental intervention plays in the realms of 
scientific and technological knowledge. They try to know about nature and that is why 
construct conceptualizations that help us do that work. But it is not less true that scientists 
and engineers must intervene in nature manipulating, changing, and forcing its limits in 
order to get not just economic benefits, but also gains in knowledge. And the most typical 
interventionist form is no doubt experimentation. 
Since the 1960s, philosophers of science have almost unanimously accepted that theory 
and experiment cannot live separately. Only a few exceptions, sometimes close to the 
new experimentalism, have tried to underline the virtues of experimentation, even by 
claiming that this has a life of its own –that is, a life independent from theory. However, 
those who supply the thesis of the theory-laden of observation –and experimentation— 
have criticized the ‗experimentalist‘ by asserting that it is not just inopportune, but also 
retrograde. This claim, of course, is not necessarily so. 
The philosophers who sustain the view of the independent nature of experiments do not 
try to completely unlink experiments from theory, but rather to place the former under a 
wider view in which experimentation is not absolutely dominated by a theoretical view. 
This point, hence, underlines that the way how the philosophy of science has focused the 
issue is a biased way that did not give enough importance to experiments and material 
practices. 
 
From my point of view, to say that experimentation has its own life means the following 
four things: 
 
(1) First, that experiments are not mere means for observing and getting data, but also 
sophisticate complexes that incorporate designed actions, skills, abilities, and conceptual 
understanding, all of which have a scientific sense by itself. 
(2) Furthermore, it means that experiments do not work only in order to assess, evaluate, 
or interpret theories, as the logical empiricists and some historicist philosophers used to 
claim. In fact, the aim of experimentation is also both to account for intended goals inner 
to wider frames of experimental practices and to adequate to open options and possible 
constraints. 
(3) In addition, it is to be emphasized the fact that experiments and their outcomes are not 
determined by the theoretical interpretation we make about them. 
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(4) Finally, I consider that experimentation generates and works with new and artificial 
phenomena whose implementation is not only due to the instantiation of laws. 
 
This proposal tries to develop four points, even though its main aim is to answer to the 
question about the own life of experimentation. Neither the theory-laden thesis nor the 
strict experimentalism is absolutely correct. A better answer can be shaped by what I 
think it is a four-side scheme of possible relationships between experiments and theory. 
In order to develop this scheme, previously I present two steps. In the first (Section 1), I 
show three characteristic cases of the thesis of the own life of experiments (the ‗science 
as technology‘ account, the instrumental experimentalism, and the exploratory 
experimentalism). In the second step (Section 2) I exhibit some replies to the previous 
cases. The proposal of the four-side scheme (independence, mere relation, dependence, 
and determination) of the ‗experiment-theory‘ relationship is the topic of the Section 3, 
which I complete with a plea for a non-polarization of the items ‗theory‘ and 
‗experiment‘ as if they were understandable in a clear and distinct way. 
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PRACTICES OF STABILIZING THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOFTWARE CODE  
 
Viktor Binzberger 
Technical University of Budapest 
 
I'd like to extend Joseph Rouse's approach of analyzing experimental situations and 
scientific knowledge in terms of the dynamics of power relations, epistemic alignments, 
and situated discursive practices into a domain different from that of constructivist 
philosophy of science: the production of software code. Following Rouse‘s perspective, 
the discursive practices of software code production share many features of the 
production of scientific knowledge. While scientists aim at stabilizing and normalizing 
experimental practices in order to be able to extend their controlled laboratory 
microworlds and their practices into society, software developers try to stabilize and 
normalize their code-producing practices for similar reasons. Doing so, they get 
entangled in dynamical power relations mediated through technological artifacts, and 
they struggle to put up resistance against the established power patterns of these socio-
technical networks, just as scientists do. Analogously to Rouse‘s arguments against the 
reification of „knowledge‖, based on its inherent situatedness within experimental 
practices and cultural context, a similar argument can be construed against the reification 
of „information‖, based on the open-endedness of the possible future interpretations of 
software code within the lifeworlds of its users and producers. 
I‘m illustrating the contemporary relevance of this philosophical thesis with two case 
studies. One is focused on shared practices of debugging and source code interpretation 
within a case of closed-source software development, and the other contrasts it with 
practices prevalent in one of the most successful projects in the Free/Libre Open Source 
world, the Mozilla Project. I‘m going to look at the various strategies practitioners are 
engaged in to establish normalized code-producing practices, and I‘m going to assess the 
breakdowns and resistances that are working antagonistically, diverting these strategies 
into locally situated adaptations, stemming from the partially diverging interpretations of 
the situation. I will touch on the role played by the architecture – or in Lawrence Lessig‘s 
terms, the ―code‖ - of certain technical artifacts in these processes (programming 
language compilers, bug tracking systems). 
By drawing this analogy, I don‘t want to downplay the differences between doing natural 
science and software development. Most significantly, software developers move in a 
world that is obviously socially constructed, whereas scientists strive to orient themselves 
toward a world that transcends our situatedness. Nevertheless, the relative stability of the 
social world in which programmers are engaged in permits us to draw the analogy, and 
the fact that the concepts of constructivist philosophy of science can be adapted to be 
used outside their originally intended domain underlines their relevance in understanding 
our contemporary technological lifeworld. 
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"ACCEPTANCE" AS A NOTION FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PRACTICE OF 
SCIENCE 
 
Frans A.J. Birrer 
Leiden University 
 
There is a growing attention for the notion of "acceptance" in connection to issues of 
knowledge, belief, truth, etc. (starting with Stalnaker, followed up by Cohen, Engel, 
Tuomela, and many others, and also more specifically in the philosophy of science, as 
prominently represented by Van Fraassen). The conceptions of 'acceptance' proposed 
vary considerably. 
I want to suggest a specific conception of the notion of "acceptance", that can be used for 
the understanding of scientific practice. Formulated very briefly, the basic idea is that an 
individual accepts or does not accept an assumption by identifying and evaluating 
potential consequences of the assumption later turning out to be valid or not. 
In order to get a realistic picture of scientific practice (and in contradistinction to Van 
Fraassen), 'consequences' are to be taken as considerably broader than merely politically 
correct criteria in science like 'arriving at the truth' or 'empirical success'. They also have 
to include more mundane incentives like endowed honors and admiration, and (in as far 
as science is applied to the real world) implications in society. That is, acceptance takes 
into account what is directly observed in the laboratory, but may also take into account 
the rewards and costs administered in the social community of scientists, and potential 
consequences of application. 
The notion of acceptance proposed here includes the possibility of deception and self-
deception. It can be extended to unconscious processes (i.e., when the acceptance is not a 
conscious decision) or even unconscious or implicit assumptions, in which case the 
understanding may take the form of a (formal) reconstruction. And of course, what an 
individual does or does not accept is highly influenced by social interactions.  
An advantage of such a broad (in terms of criteria) and yet specific (tied to consequences 
and their evaluation) conception of 'acceptance' is that it creates room for sociological 
understanding without falling into an abyss of unbridled relativism. Differences of 
opinion can occur, but may be understood as differences in consequences taken into 
account, and as differences in the evaluation of consequences.  
One possibility for such a consequential framework would be some kind of Bayesian 
decision model. Often, however, more deductive models of reasoning are observed. This 
need not surprise us, given the weaknesses of such models in practice (steeply raising 
complexity of calculations; arbitrariness of priori's when prior information is lacking). In 
the consequential framework proposed, deductive models can be understood as if each 
premise is separately evaluated as accepted or not accepted given the problem at hand 
(context of consequences), which then allows combination of singular assumptions into a 
(quasi-)deductive form of reasoning.
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ENGINEERING MODELS: IS THERE A DIFFERENCE? 
 
C C Bissell 
Open University (UK) 
 
Engineeering, like science, uses many mathematical descriptions of the world. Because 
engineering models use many of the same mathematical techniques as scientific models 
(differential equations, Fourier and Laplace transformations, vectors, tensors, for 
example) it is easy to assume that they are one and the same in essence. Yet in the case of 
engineering (and technology in general) such models are likely to be used more for 
design than for understanding the natural world. This means that historically there has 
been just as great – if not greater – emphasis on rules-of-thumb, charts, and empirical 
models as there has been on analytical models (although the latter have also been vitally 
important in areas such as electronics, mechanics, chemical and civil engineering, and so 
on). 
 
This paper will examine some of the characteristics of technological/engineering models 
that are likely to be unfamiliar to those who are interested primarily the history and 
philosophy of science, and which differentiate technological models from scientific ones. 
Themes that will be highlighted include: 
 
 the role of language: the models developed for engineering design have resulted 
in new ways of talking about technological systems 
 communities of practice: related to the previous point, particular engineering 
communities have particular ways of sharing and developing knowledge 
 graphical (re)presentation: engineers have developed many ways of reducing 
quite complex mathematical models to more simple representations (examples 
will be given from information engineeering) 
 reification: highly abstract mathematical models are turned into ‗objects‘ that can 
be manipulated almost like components of a physical system 
 machines: not only the currently ubiquitous digital computer, but also older 
analogue devices – slide rules, physical models, wind tunnels and other small-
scale simulators, as well as mechanical, electrical and electronic analogue 
computers 
 
Engineering models of the type discussed in the paper are not always highly valued in 
formal engineering education at university level, which often takes an ―applied science‖ 
approach close to that of the natural sciences (something that can result in disaffection on 
the part of students). Yet in an informal context, such as laboratories, industrial 
placements, and so on, a very different situation obtains. The paper will also consider 
such epistemological aspects, as well as the status of different types of models within the 
engineering education community.
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SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY AS STRUCTURED IMAGINATION 
 
Helen De Cruz 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
 
What mechanisms underlie scientific creativity; what enables scientists to make 
significant contributions to their disciplines? The quest by philosophers of science for 
some rationale behind scientific discovery and creativity has been recently joined by 
cognitive scientists. They examine what guides the scientific process and in what ways it 
resembles or differs from ordinary, everyday thought. In this paper I offer an analysis of 
the nature of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and experimental results of 
the cognitive sciences. The core idea is that scientific creativity—like other forms of 
creativity—is structured and constrained by prior ontological expectations. Inductive 
inferences and causal reasoning processes in laypeople and even young children are 
based on intuitive ontological expectations, suggesting that this may be a stable and 
universal feature of human cognition (De Cruz & De Smedt, in press). For example, 
when subjects are asked to invent extraterrestrial beings, they do not produce a limitless 
variety of creatures, but rather draw upon their knowledge of terrestrial life forms, such 
as that animals possess sense organs and exhibit bilateral symmetry (Ward, 1994). 
Likewise, religious ideas across cultures do not display an unlimited variability, but are 
constrained by ontological expectations, e.g., gods, like other agents, are invariably 
conceptualized as having desires, emotions and intentions (Boyer, 2001). Like other 
people, scientists are guided in their research by implicit and explicit ontological 
assumptions, by which they a priori gauge the outcome of an experimental setup or assess 
the plausibility of a result. Such ontological expectations play a major role in scientific 
understanding, an account that accords well with previous findings from philosophy of 
science (e.g., De Regt & Dieks, 2005). While ontological expectations can explain the 
constraints on scientific creativity, they cannot account for major shifts in scientific 
understanding. Applying results from creativity research in everyday thought on 
scientific practice (e.g., Estes & Ward, 2002), I suggest that scientific creativity arises 
when scientists apply the ontological structure of one domain to a different target domain. 
I illustrate this model of scientific creativity with examples from the history of science, 
such as Harvey, who imported concepts from physics and mathematics to elucidate the 
human circulatory system, an understanding that would have been impossible if solely 
based on the ontology underlying biological explanations of that time.  
 
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained. The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York: Basic 
Books. 
De Cruz, H., & De Smedt, J. (in press). The role of intuitive ontologies in scientific understanding—The 
case of human evolution. Biology and Philosophy. 
De Regt, H.W., & Dieks, D. (2005). A contextual approach to scientific understanding. Synthese, 144, 137–
170. 
Estes, Z. & Ward, T.B. (2002). The emergence of novel attributes in concept modification. Creativity 
Research Journal, 14, 149–156. 
Ward, T.B. (1994). Structured imagination: The role of category structure in exemplar generation. 
Cognitive Psychology, 27, 1–40.
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PRACTICES OF MATHEMATIZATION 
 
Fokko Jan Dijksterhuis 
University of Twente 
 
Mathematization – both as a historical and a epistemic phenomenon – is commonly 
understood as the application of mathematics to natural, technical, societal objects. Such 
an understanding raises a number of questions: what mathematics is applied, what does 
application involve, what does this application of mathematics produce? Is the 
mathematics some kind of ready-made that can be pasted upon non-mathematical objects 
producing specific interpretations of mathematical structures without essentially altering 
them? Or does the process of application involves transformations of mathematical 
conceptions resulting in new modes of mathematical reasoning? In other words: what 
does it mean to develop mathematics in natural and other domains and how is this 
brought about?  
In this paper I will approach this subject-matter from a historical perspective, in particular 
that of early-modern history of science. From this perspective the above questions 
become even more pressing because our modern conceptions of mathematics, 
application, etc. did not exist. The distinction of pure and applied mathematics is a 
nineteenth-century invention. Prior to the rationalizing strategies of Lagrange, Cauchy 
and the like, mathematics had an emperical basis that is best exemplified by the early-
modern concept of ‗mixed mathematics‘. In such diverse fields as mechanics, optics, 
navigation, surveying mathematics was pursued rather than imported from some external 
domain of pure mathematics. Mathematics was a broad domain of heterogenuous 
mathematical pursuits, the stratification of which still needs historical clarification. In the 
meantime, the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a tremendous 
spread of mathematical practices. Mathematical reasoning entered countless new domains 
of inquiry and invention: heavenly and terrestrial motions, streams of airs and fluids, the 
nature of light, chance, ships, and so on, and so on. It is not without reason that 
mathematization has been regarded as a defining characteristic of the Scientific 
Revolution. The question is how this proces of mathematization took place. I will 
confront this question by looking at a few historical instances of mathematization.  
For example Christiaan Huygens‘ wave theory of light (1677), in which he developed a 
mathematical structure for the motions of ethereal particles that account for light. I will 
argue that, in effect, he managed to introduce mathematical reasoning in the natural 
philosophical domains of light physics. I will further argue that this mathematization 
consisted of the extension of his prior pursuit of geometrical optics – the analyses of light 
rays refracted in lenses – towards questions of the physical nature of light. 
Mathematization, in other words, consisted of the transfer of a mathematical practice to a 
new domain of natural inquiry. Likewise, Charles-Augustion Coulomb succesfull 
determination of electrostatic and magnetic forces (1787) consisted of a transfer of 
mathematical practices to new domains. Coulomb built upon his experiences as engineer 
and instrument designer when confronting the experimental philosophical question of the 
measure of electricity and magnetism. In so doing he went beyond the Newtonian mode 
of elementary analysis of forces by developing a material model of his analysis, the 
torsion balance.  
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Such transfers of practices also entail transfers of knowledge claims. Early modern 
mathematics, natural philosophy, engineering, each had their own conceptions of the 
truth, range, foundation and purpose of knowledge and a transfer may also imply the 
introduction of foreign conceptions. Huygens developed quite a novel conception of 
natural philosophical truth in his wave theory of light, privileging comprehensibility 
rather than certainty. Exploring circulation of practices between knowledge traditions (in 
a Kuhnian sense) I will try to develop a historically informed understanding of 
mathematization in inquiry and invention. 
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EXPLANATION, PREDICTION, AND WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE 
 
Heather Douglas 
University of Tennessee 
 
In evaluating evidence for use in policy-making, the standard approach used to be 
focused on one particularly well done toxicological study (e.g. with a well characterized 
strain of animal, a large study population, appropriate dose levels, and a properly timed 
dosing regime), which was then utilized for setting acceptable exposure levels for 
humans.   However, concerns over the applicability of animal studies for humans have 
risen, and some epidemiological studies have suggested effects (or a lack of effects) 
where animal studies have suggested the opposite outcome.  At the same time, studies of 
the biochemistry at the cellular level have increased understandings of mechanisms of 
action.  With increased attention to these additional bodies of evidence, scientists are 
increasingly called on to ―weigh‖ a body of evidence as a whole, rather than utilize a 
more narrow subset of it, when making claims about the likely risks posed by substances 
of concern. 
In traditional philosophy of science contexts, ―weight of evidence‖ refers to the strength 
of support a piece of evidence e lends to a hypothesis H.  (see, e.g., Good 1982, 1987)  
Such formal confirmation considerations offer little guidance to scientists in the policy 
context, where weight of evidence refers instead to what to make of a complex body of 
evidence from multiple disciplines.  The question is not how much support does evidence 
give to the hypothesis but rather what does the evidence as a whole, potentially 
contradictory as it often seems, indicate.  In other words, it is combining all of the 
evidence into a coherent e that is needed. 
In order to approach this problem, this paper will argue that thinking about the 
relationship between explanation and prediction provides useful guidance.  What the 
scientist in the policy context seeks are reliable predictions above all else.  Explanations 
that don‘t serve this end are of little use.  But it is in constructing explanatory accounts of 
the complex body of evidence that the weighing occurs.  Indeed, in the most recent EPA 
cancer risk assessment guidelines, ―weight-of-evidence narratives‖ play a key role.  So 
how should scientists construct explanatory accounts of bodies of evidence in ways that 
will enhance their predictive reliability? 
The paper will argue for an approach that attempts to guard against ad hocery in the 
dismissal of evidence that does not fit a preferred explanatory framework.  Prevention of 
early dismissal of problematic evidence and the generation of rival explanatory accounts 
are central principles of the approach.  However, there is additionally the need to push the 
best explanatory accounts available.  That is, scientists should be keen to develop 
additional readily testable predictions from the accounts with the most explanatory 
power, in order to fulfill the explanatory promise of the accounts and to examine their 
reliability before widespread acceptance.  This means that explanatory power per se 
should not be a reason to accept a weight of evidence account.  It is the utilization of 
explanatory power to generate new, testable predictions that is important.  The success of 
such predictions should then bolster our confidence in our weighing of the evidence.
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PARTICIPATION OR DEMARCATION? ANIMAL SCIENCE AND ANIMAL ETHICS 
IN ACTION 
 
Clemens Driessen 
Wageningen University 
 
Pressing ethical issues have emerged in livestock farming over the last decades. Whereas 
animal production in the second half of the twentieth century developed almost solely in 
terms of increasing production volumes, downsides of this development into intensive 
farming have also become apparent. Apart from production surpluses, these most notably 
are environmental degradation and problems of animal welfare. The aims of animal 
scientists have changed accordingly. Having previously been instrumental in creating 
high yielding breeds and farming systems, now their work is understood in terms of 
fostering a more complex set of parameters related to sustainability and animal welfare.  
In this paper the case of animal welfare is taken up to study approaches of animal 
scientists in dealing with ethical issues. In animal welfare studies science and ethics, 
doing research and making value judgments, are found to be blended activities. Defining 
and standardising farm animal welfare criteria can for instance be done in terms of 
behavioural and veterinarian indicators, and in terms of qualities of animals, their housing 
and their management. Ethical theories defending the importance of animal welfare and 
aimed at helping to decide on difficult issues diverge as well. 
A number of animal scientists working for a large publicly funded research institute in 
the Netherlands were studied. The animal scientists take part in various research and 
development projects, some of which involve farmers, NGOs and agribusiness 
corporations. These projects aim in various ways at improving animal welfare by 
developing new farming systems and practices.  
Considerable differences were found to exist in the ways animal scientists dealt with 
ethical issues. These are related to ways of approaching power structures and dispersed 
decision-making, the type of governmental regulations envisioned, perceptions of 
scientific uncertainties and distributions of knowledge, and the need for farm level 
implementation.  
Different modes of dealing with these issues are discerned. First, an ethical approach 
aimed at problem solving and dealing with uncertainties and ambiguities by means of 
participatory schemes. Second, an approach aimed at criticising and controlling livestock 
farming by means of demarcating science and ethics and sticking to strict scientific 
norms. And third, an approach that is aimed at creating innovation networks and enabling 
farmers themselves to deal with ethical issues.  
The implications of these approaches for blends of scientific research and ethical 
considerations are discussed. It is argued that in a field like animal welfare studies, the 
aim of science should not necessarily be understood as representing the animal 
scientifically but as ethically motivated representing of the interests of animals in the 
design of production systems. In that way the choices and priorities that are part of 
animal science in practice are made more explicit, enabling scrutiny of both science and 
ethics. 
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STATING THE “HARD PROBLEM” OF SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING 
 
Steffen Ducheyne 
Universiteit van Gent 
 
According to De Regt and Dieks‘s CIT–criterion, it suffices that a scientist recognizes the 
―qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without performing exact calculations‖ to 
obtain scientific understanding. On this account, Newton‘s recognition that the Moon 
constantly falls toward the earth, for instance, would be enough to provide scientific 
understanding of that phenomenon. However, I claim that it is only by making the 
hypothesis that the Moon is attracted by the earth empirically significant that proper 
scientific understanding is provided. Mind that the contrast I draw between potential 
understanding and proper understanding does not correspond to the difference between 
true or false theories (or true and false explanation) (this is De Regt‘s criticism on Trout, 
see De Regt, 2003, pp. 107-108; cf. Trout 2004, pp. 203-205). Whether a hypothesis 
(which is accepted by a scientist in a certain context) is objectively true or not is an 
entirely different debate, which has already been the focus of several volumes. The 
distinction I make here refers to fact that, in the case of proper understanding, a scientist 
is able to ascertain what the concrete, testable consequences of a theory are. This says 
nothing about whether these consequences are further confirmed of justified. One may 
therefore distinguish a third kind of understanding: justified understanding, which occurs 
when the empirical consequences of a properly understood theory turn out to be 
confirmed. It is only by demonstrating that the value of terrestrial gravitation, predicted 
by the assumption that the Moon is drawn by an inverse-square centripetal force, agrees 
to measurements of terrestrial gravity that justified scientific understanding is established. 
In other words, the problem for De Regt and Dieks is that such qualitative characteristic 
consequences need to be translated into empirically significant consequences in order to 
establish proper scientific understanding and need to be tested by phenomena in order to 
establish justified scientific understanding. Needless to say that potential understanding 
can be very promising from a heuristic point of view. Such qualitative intuitions or 
working hypotheses are the necessary point of departure of every scientist. However, I 
claim, that to provide proper scientific understanding means rendering qualitative 
intuitions empirically significant. In other words, proper scientific understanding amounts 
to seeing how a theory generates its empirical consequences. Abstract theory is 
interpreted empirically; a working hypothesis is thought through.  
The ―hard problem‖ of scientific understanding consists in providing insight into the 
ways in which scientists manipulate abstract theories into empirically testable 
interpretations of concrete natural phenomena. In the end, I have arrived at a novel way 
stating the ―hard problem‖ of scientific understanding.  
 
De Regt H.W. (2004), Discussion Note: Making Sense of Understanding, Philosophy of Science 71, 98-109.  
De Regt H. W.  & Dieks, D. (2005), A Contextual Approach To Scientific Understanding, Synthese 144, 
137-170. 
Trout, J.D. (2002), Scientific Understanding and the Sense of Understanding, Philosophy of Science 
69,212-233. 
Trout, J.D. (2005), Paying the Price for a Theory of Explanation: De Regt‘s Discussion of Trout, 
Philosophy of Science 72, pp. 198-208.
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FOUND SCIENCE: FOUNDING „RACE‟ IN BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE 
 
Sophia Efstathiou 
UC San Diego 
 
Two associations are drawn in recent genetics literature. (1) The structure of human 
genetic variation corresponds to continental geographical regions (Rosenberg et al. 2002, 
2005).  (2) The structure of human genetic variation in the US falls under self-identified 
race/ethnicity categories (Tang et al. 2005). These results suggest that common ‗race‘ 
categories can well approximate human genetic variation (Tang et al. 2005).  
 
I call this a case of ―found science‖. By analogy to found art objects, a ready-made object 
foreign –and even counter- to the domain of science can become found and founded as 
science –and thereupon function as science. I argue that the installation of the common 
category ―race‖ in the context of genetics is a case of found science. A ready-made notion 
of ‗race‘ is found in science by being installed in the US census and used to stratify 
medical data and it is founded as science by being installed in the context of interests 
(epistemic and pragmatic ones) and the spatial contexts (physical and discursive ones) 
wherein biomedical science is practiced.  
 
Found science is an account of how common entities can enter the practice of science. It 
is also an account for how found entities come to differ from ordinary entities. Founding 
tools are used to install the common entities in scientific contexts of use and interests. 
These tools must find these entities in the contexts of science before they can found them. 
This means that a found scientific entity is a re-articulation of an ordinary entity in the 
terms particular to the scientific context of use and interest in question. The found 
scientific entity should not be mistaken for the same (one) ordinary entity. I use this 
frame to argue that ‗found race‘ notions are not ‗race‘. And I demonstrate the frame is 
salient by examining how found race notions differ across the biomedical domains of 
epidemiology and genetics.   
 
 
Falush Daniel, Matthew Stephens and Jonathan K. Pritchard (2003), ―Inference of Population Structure 
Using Multilocus Genotype Data: Linked Loci and Correlated Allele Frequencies‖, Genetics 164: 1567-
1587 (August 2003) 
Pritchard JK, Matthew Stephens and Peter Donnely (2000), ―Inference of Population Structure Using 
Multilocus Genotype Data‖, Genetics 155, 945-959 (June 2000) 
Root Michael (2003), ―The Use of Race is Medicine as a Proxy for Genetic Differences‖, Philosophy of 
Science, (2003) 70: 1173-1183  
Rosenberg et al. (2002), ―Genetic Structure of Human Populations‖, Science (2002) 298: 2381- 2385 
-------- (2005) ―Clines, Clusters, and the Effect of Study Design on the Inference of Human Population 
Structure‖, PLoS Genetics, www.plosgenetics.com, Dec 2005, Vol 1, Issue 6 e70 pp 0660-0671  
Tang Hua, Neil Risch et al. (2005), ―Genetic structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and confounding in 
case-control association studies‖ Am. J. Hum. Genet. (2005) 76:268–275  
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THE ROLE OF ANALOGIES FOR SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING: AN EXAMPLE 
FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
 
Kai Eigner 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
 
In their endeavor to understand reality, scientists formulate models that represent 
phenomena in the world. (1)In order to justify that these models are good representation 
of aspects of reality it is not sufficient to mention the similarities between models and 
reality. Similarities and differences can always be found, but these are not always 
relevant. For a model to be a good representation it is required firstly that scientists are 
able to explicitly indicate the relevant aspects of it, and secondly that they can indicate 
the parallels between these aspects and aspects of reality. In other words, a model is a 
good representation of reality if scientists are able to indicate the relations of analogy 
between the model and reality. 
 
Philosophy of science literature lacks a substantial analysis of this ability to indicate the 
relations of analogy. Prominent philosophers of science who have written about models 
and analogies, such as Mary Hesse, have not made clear what this ability consists in. For 
instance when she discusses the relations of analogy between sound and light, Hesse 
argues that our knowledge that the amplitude of sound waves determines the volume of 
sound ―immediately makes it reasonable‖ to suppose that the amplitude of light waves 
determines the brightness of light.(2) Although Hesse suggests that we can find these 
analogies in our language, she does not clarify how this works and it remains unclear why 
it is immediately reasonable to formulate these relations of analogy. 
 
In my presentation I will discuss how scientists formulate these relations in practice. I 
will investigate how they assess the relevance of different aspects of the models and how 
they determine whether these aspects have similarities with reality. In this investigation I 
will make use of an example from psychology. 
 
A scientific discipline in which the development of models is highly valued is cognitive 
psychology. In the 1950‘s, a driving force in the development of this discipline came 
from the analysis of humans as information processors. Psychologists incorporated terms 
from information theory and used the computer as metaphor for human behavior. They 
argued that humans have limited capacity for the intake and storage of information 
(notated in bits). Humans receive information from the environment, and this information 
is encoded, manipulated, stored, and eventually retrieved. One of the pioneers of 
cognitive psychology was Donald Broadbent (1926 – 1993). He introduced the 
information processing paradigm in his research of attention, decision, and memory. 
Broadbent was inspired by the methods of engineers from information technology. He 
was for instance the first psychologist in modern times to use flow charts in the 
development of models of human information processing. Broadbent related his 
information theoretical models to aspects of human behavior by pointing out certain 
relations of analogy. (3) In my presentation I will investigate why Broadbent considered 
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these relationships to be warranted. Subsequently I will present more general conclusions 
regarding the use of relations of analogy in science. 
 
1. Giere, R.N., ―How Models Are Used to Represent Reality‖, Philosophy of Science 71 (2004) 742-752. 
2. Hesse, M.B., Models and Analogies in Science (Sheed and Ward, London and New York: 1963) p. 34. 
3. Broadbent, D.E., ―A Mechanical Model for Human Attention and Immediate Memory‖, Psychological 
Review 64, 3 (1957) 205-215.
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RE-READING HANSON: OBSERVATIONS AND THEIR OBJECTS 
 
Uljana Feest 
TU Berlin 
 
In the philosophy of science the topic of observation is usually discussed in relation to the 
question of how scientific observations can provide evidence for a theory or hypothesis. 
As is well known, the very notion that observations can play this role was called into 
question by arguments about theoryladenness and underdetermination. These arguments, 
in turn, have prompted other philosophers to argue (often by reference to examples from 
scientific practice) that these threats do not in fact exist, or – to the extent that they exist – 
that they can be dealt with by the methods of scientific inquiry. While sympathetic to 
these arguments, it seems to me that the defenders of objectivity and rationality have let 
themselves be pushed somewhat into the defensive. As a result they have focused on 
arguing against the supposed threats of theory-ladenness, rather than inquiring into the 
positive contributions that scientific observations (and, if you will, their theory-
ladenness) make to the generation of scientific knowledge. My own take in this paper 
will be slightly different, namely to raise the question of what is the context in, and 
purpose for which, empirical observations are made in scientific research, and how an 
analysis of this question might affect our very understanding of ―observation‖.  
 
In the existing literature, there seems to be an implicit presupposition to the effect that the 
purpose of making scientific observations or of gathering empirical data is that of 
justifying or confirming theories. This is interesting, given that Norwood Russell Hanson 
(1958), when he famously put the theory-ladenness of observation on the philosophical 
agenda, did so in the context of talking about scientific discovery, i.e., about the 
construction of theories. It is this latter topic that I would like to address. In particular, I 
am interested in the fact that in the discovery process, observations often take place in the 
context of relative ignorance. In other words, scientists are not sure what it is that they are 
observing. In fact (and I am being deliberately ambiguous here), they do empirical work 
precisely in order to find out what it is they are observing. This raises philosophical 
questions about the activity of scientific observation in the discovery process. I will argue 
that the very concept of observation, just like that of discovery, conceptually requires the 
idea that there is an object of observation. When we read Hanson‘s work on theory-
ladenness in conjunction with his work on scientific discovery, it emerges that we do not 
need to attribute to him some of the more radically relativist views sometimes associated 
with the notion of theory-ladenness. The question he was asking was how empirical 
scientists come to an understanding of what is their object of observation. In my paper, I 
will endorse and develop this question on two fronts: First, I will provide a brief 
overview of the ways in which philosophical discourse about observation has shifted 
throughout the 20th century even amongst the more ―conservative‖ philosophers of 
science, making room for a renewed reading of Hanson‘s objectives. Second, I will 
discuss some options of giving a philosophical account of how to think about the objects 
of observation in the process of scientific discovery. 
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UNDERSTANDING FORMAL METHODS AS MODELS – THE CASE OF CAUSAL 
INFERENCE 
 
Damien Fennell 
LSE 
 
There are many different formal methods of causal inference.  To name but a few, there is 
structural equation models in econometrics, potential response models and the recent 
development of Bayesian networks.  The purpose of such methods is to present a 
mathematical and/or statistical tool to conceptualise and find out about causes.  These 
methods have been widely adopted by scientists and some have even been used to present 
justifications of widely-used, experimental methods such as randomized controlled trials.   
The formal methods are particularly influential in sciences where experimentation is 
difficult, where the appeal to a formal method can be used to make explicit and justify 
assumptions on which causal claims rest. 
 
These methods of causal inference, when formalised in a complete way, that is, where a 
concept of cause is defined and a deductive analysis presented of how the underlying 
causes can be identified, and strengths measured from observation, provide a ‗model of 
causal inference‘. This paper argues that the term ‗model‘ is a crucial.  It is a necessary 
response to the view that some particular formal method of causal inference has (or can 
have) the ‗right‘ or ‗universal‘ concept of cause.  It argues that different – and often 
irreconcilable – concepts of cause have their uses in different contexts.  Each method of 
causal inference presents one idealised way to make inferences to what is represented by 
their particular concept of a cause.  Yet, typically, there are different ways to find out 
about that kind of cause.  So, these methods present one concept of cause among many 
and one method among many for finding out about that kind of cause.  The methods are 
idealisations, since many complexities, conceptual and epistemic, are assumed away.   In 
this way, these formalisations of causal inference are ‗models‘.  They present toy-like 
simplifications that can, under certain circumstances, be used to understand, engage with 
and sometimes effectively control the world around us.   
 
Drawing on the recent literature on models in philosophy of science, the paper argues that 
revising our view of methods as models, opens up the opportunity for more constructive 
methodological analysis.  It argues that the arid, abstract philosophical arguments over 
which concept of causation is best universally, can be transformed into more insightful 
discussions of the strengths and limits of various methods when recast as arguments over 
the appropriateness of models of causes and their inference for the context to which they 
are applied.    
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TOTAL EVIDENCE AND EMPIRICAL INDISPENSABILITY: WHY ALL (OR EVEN 
MORE) EVIDENCE ISN‟T ALWAYS BETTER IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 
 
Grant Fisher 
University College London 
 
The total evidence requirement is a normative rule that underpins the justification of 
belief by evidence. It is instantiated broadly in epistemology and in a variety of accounts 
of confirmation particularly. In its simplest terms, the requirement stipulates that belief in 
a hypothesis should be justified by the all evidence at our disposal. Belief in a hypothesis 
on the grounds that it is supported by some evidence when there is also disconfirming 
evidence is no justification for belief at all. In confirmation theory, Carnap employs the 
total evidence requirement as a methodological rule for the application of inductive logic. 
It also underpins van Fraassen‘s concept of empirical adequacy. However, the total 
evidence is objectionable on the grounds that it is aimed at ideal rather than actual agents. 
The collection, interpretation and assessment of all evidence, even if limited to the 
domain of ―relevant evidence‖, is unrealisable in practice. Goldman argues that the 
requirement fails to accommodate the cognitive limits of actual agents and conflicts with 
the ―ought implies can‖ maxim normally adopted in ethics. While I agree that the total 
evidence requirement is practically unrealisable and is therefore not a normatively 
binding rule for actual agents, an epistemic position must be articulated which explains 
what beliefs we can have in empirically inadequate theories and models and what warrant 
we have for those beliefs. 
 
My aim in this paper is to undermine the intuition that predictive success with respect to 
all (or even ―more‖) available evidence is nominally the basis for the justification of 
beliefs in scientific practice. The problem is not merely that the total evidence 
requirement is aimed at ideal rather than actual agents; the requirement obfuscates the 
epistemic status of empirically inadequate hypotheses and models that nevertheless serve 
an essential practical function in science. Even empirically inadequate hypothesis or 
models can have some predictive successes. But partial predictive success does not, by 
itself, ameliorate our understanding of the epistemic justification of theories or models 
that fail to predict all evidence in their domains. I argue that in some crucial cases, 
empirically inadequate hypotheses and models perform a critical function in scientific 
practice to such an extent that some predictions cannot even be attempted without them. 
For example, the nuclear shell model is notable for a number of predictive failures in its 
domain. While other models of the nucleus are relatively empirically successful, the 
successful quantitative prediction of some nuclear properties cannot be done without the 
assumption of independent particle motions. The shell model has to be used as a matter of 
practical necessity. In cases such as this, although partial predictive success and practical 
necessity does not warrant belief in empirically adequacy, it does warrant the belief that a 
hypothesis or model is what I shall call ―empirically indispensable‖. Empirical 
indispensability is a crucial and hitherto unarticulated belief that applies to actual agents 
engaged in scientific practice. 
  67 
DATA AND PHENOMENA 
 
Stuart Gluck 
University of Twente 
 
Bogen and Woodward (1988) have proposed a distinction between data and phenomena 
which they think is crucial for understanding scientific practice.  Loosely speaking, data 
are the observations reported by experimental scientists, while phenomena are objective, 
stable features of the world to which scientists infer based on reliable data.  Theories 
predict and explain facts about phenomena, not data, and so claims about phenomena 
serve as the evidence in support of a theory.  Their proposal is important—it was among 
the first work by analytic philosophers that was attentive to the intricacies of 
experimental scientific practice—and interesting—it promises a fundamental framework 
for conceiving of scientific methodology—but it has, surprisingly, generated only a 
moderate amount of direct discussion in the philosophy of science literature.  For 
example, James R. Brown (1994) endorses it with minor modifications, James McAllister 
(1997) agrees that it is an important distinction but argues that phenomena must be 
investigator relative rather than objective features of the world as Bogen and Woodward 
claim, while Bruce Glymour (2000) argues that the distinction is at best superfluous and 
at worst misleading.  This is a careful consideration of Bogen and Woodward‘s proposal, 
including an evaluation of the criticisms of McAllister and Glymour. 
 
Bogen and Woodward suggest that phenomena do not explain data.  This is crucial, since 
otherwise theories would explain phenomena and phenomena in turn data, effectively 
making phenomena low-level theories.  Instead they characterize the data-phenomena 
relationship by discussing a number of considerations one can use to justify claims about 
phenomena from data, which revolve around assessing the reliability of the data.  These 
considerations are justificatory, leaving open the question of how scientists discern or 
discover phenomena in the first place.  The suggestion is that phenomena manifest 
themselves as patterns in data sets.  McAllister argues that there are always infinitely 
many patterns in any data set, and so the choice of one as being a phenomenon is simply 
stipulated by the investigator.  Glymour suggests that the fact that statistical inferences 
always move from a claim about sample statistics to the inferred proposition (a sort of 
double inference) already captures in a formal way anything worthwhile in the data-
phenomena distinction.  But it seems that treating phenomena as patterns in data sets 
misses a crucial point Hanson made about the relationship between hypotheses and 
observations, and which would appear just as relevant for Bogen and Woodward‘s 
account of data and phenomena: phenomena are not merely summaries of the data.  If 
phenomena don‘t explain data, then at least there is something more to them than just 
patterns, summaries, or statistical features.  What could this be?  Bogen and Woodward 
suggest they want to devalue a consideration common in philosophy of science which 
they think is an artifact of British Empiricism, namely, that perception and sense 
experience have an epistemologically privileged status regarding the justification of 
beliefs about the natural world.  Whether Bogen and Woodward‘s distinction can thus be 
made more cogent in a less empiricist sort of framework will be explored. 
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EMBEDDING OF VALUES IN SCIENCE: THE CASE OF ADHD RESEARCH 
 
Susan Hawthorne 
University of Minnesota 
 
The convergence of interests of scientists who study attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) with those of educators, parents, clinicians, ADHD-diagnosable 
individuals, and others has resulted in an alliance (in Bruno Latour‘s sense) that shapes 
the scientific and cultural understanding of ADHD. Elsewhere I establish that (1) cultural 
disvaluation of ADHD-associated traits is embedded in the diagnostic criteria, and (2) 
that social and scientific practices, as well as scientific results, tend to reinforce 
legitimacy of the ADHD category in positive feedback loops. In this paper, I argue that 
the allies‘ goals and values are embedded as well in the content of the science that defines 
and investigates ADHD. 
Embedding occurs in at least two ways. Broadly, funding patterns that back the interests 
of science‘s allies embed those interests in the science by influencing the direction of 
research. Publication rates show that ADHD research in the US is primarily directed to 
physiological and psychological basic research, and to clinical research that includes drug 
treatment. In contrast, significantly less research targets (for example) ADHD 
epidemiology, or strategies for teaching ADHD-diagnosable children. As a result, despite 
the plurality of sciences involved in investigating ADHD, the ADHD literature is focused 
on particular ADHD-associated behaviors or traits and certain forms of management, 
possibly to the detriment of understanding others. 
Deeper, however, is the embedding of goals and values in the terminology, variables, and 
data interpretation that are integral to basic and clinical research. The embedding occurs 
because the research is planned, performed, analyzed, and described in the complex 
scientific/cultural context of associations with ADHD. It might seem that research 
concerning particular aspects of ADHD—e.g., its genetics, neurophysiology, or 
neuroanatomy—could be isolated from this context; similarly for specific variables of 
interest, such as the DRD4 7-repeat allele, performance on Go/No Go tasks, or caudate 
volume. Indeed, one goal of most studies is to find a (value neutral) difference between 
―ADHD‖ and ―control‖ groups with respect to a given variable. However, the difference 
between groups with respect to the variable is linked by empirical evidence or hypothesis 
to the between-groups difference with respect to ADHD status. Possession of the allele, 
―poor‖ performance on the Go/No Go task, or smaller caudate volume become associated 
with disvalued ADHD status. Thus, in describing results, language of ―difference‖ often 
shifts to language of ―deficiency‖ or another value-valenced term. Usually, no argument 
is supplied for this transition, because the ―obviousness‖ of the valence in the context of 
ADHD hides the need for a rationale. Thus, the variables, and the terminology used to 
describe them, take on value-valenced meanings via association with ADHD, and most 
interpretations of the data assume this value valence in analyzing the results. (As Putnam 
puts it, description and prescription become inextricably entangled.) The further step in 
which scientists recommend clinical, educational, or policy approaches introduces an 
opportunity for embedding of goals or values in the recommendations. Finally, reiteration 
of value valence in thousands of scientific papers, and in translations to popular media, 
reinforces the pre-existing disvaluation of ADHD.
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EXPLANATION, UNDERSTANDING AND OPACITY 
 
Cyrille Imbert 
PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne 
 
Dominant accounts of scientific explanation agree on the fact that explanations provide 
understanding. It does so by showing how something was to be expected (in Hempel‘s 
model) or how things work (in Salmon‘s causal model), by shedding light on some 
portion of an ideal explanatory text (according to Railton), or by using patterns that unify 
our beliefs (according to Kitcher). 
My first point is that all these accounts are so far badly suited to show how explanation 
does help develop actual understanding in scientific practice. For an explanation to bring 
understanding, one must be able to survey the explanation and this takes cognitive or 
computational resources. Since none of these accounts make mention of any kind of such 
resources, the concept of understanding that they rely on is at best woefully 
underdescribed. This is the understanding that an archangelic creature endowed with 
potentially infinite cognitive resources could get and this is typical of what Humphreys 
(2004) has labelled ―science in principle‖. I further argue that a better understanding of a 
system is usually associated with a decrease in the required computational resources. I 
illustrate this with examples taken from fluid dynamics. Overall, this shows that the 
question of resources should at least be discussed when debating about scientific 
explanation.  
The second part of this presentation is devoted to clear the way for a notion of 
explanation that enables one to describe how one more or less easily understands the 
explained facts. My aim is to start filling the gap between the rich literature about 
explanation and complexity theory, which precisely studies needs in computational 
resources. To that effect, I sketch a notion, opacity, which is defined in terms of the 
amount of computational resources that one needs in order to grasp an explanation and 
use it. I do not rely on any peculiar theory of explanation for that. Instead, I list 
constraints that must be fulfilled for the notion of opacity  to work. I show that for the 
same system, opacity is relative to the properties that one wants to account for and that, 
for the same system and property, opacity depends on the facts from which one starts the 
building of the explanation. I argue that that does not imply that opacity is a totally 
epistemic notion, but that it does, at least partly, characterize systems themselves 
(relatively to some properties). For example, for a system that is just before a fully-
developed turbulent regime, opacity is high during turbulence bursts and low during 
laminar phases, and this seems to be an intrinsic feature.  
   I conclude that 1. it will however be difficult for opacity to be a totally intrinsic feature, 
since applying complexity theory implies some relativity to a format. 2. a concept like 
opacity should help us refine how actual fundamental and applied science works, since it 
relies more and more on computers. 3. a theory of explanation that would help show how 
to use the notion properly would really make a point. 
 
Humphreys, Paul, Extending Ourselves, OUP, 2004.  
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CAUSAL UNDERSTANDING IN BIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS  
 
Michael Joffe 
 
The motivating impulse for this paper is that biology has become a highly successful 
science in the past century, and that biological examples can be used to illuminate certain 
aspects of economics, despite the large differences between them. Thus the careful use of 
analogy, that explores contrasts as well as parallels between these two disciplines, can 
help to explore causal relations in economics, which are widely believed to be 
inadequately characterised in economics as currently practiced, perhaps especially in 
mainstream economics.  
If we want to understand causal processes, the best topics for study are areas of science 
where the explanations are well established. One area within biology is physiology 
(including biochemistry, cell biology etc): the study of the workings of the body. Whilst 
many aspects remain to be elucidated, physiology has developed a core knowledge base 
that commands universal agreement among scientists, and fulfils the other criteria of a 
mature, established science.  
Using physiological examples that require no specialist biological knowledge, I explore 
what biologists mean by understanding causality. The fundamental concept is 
mechanism, understood either as underlying chemical/physical processes, or as a set of 
hypothetical properties, e.g. imperfect replication in an informative environment in the 
case of evolution. For example, it has long been established that propagation of a nerve 
impulse across a synapse is mediated chemically rather than electrically, and the 
chemicals involved and the processes for their synthesis and control are well understood. 
That one can use the apparently teleological concept of ―control‖ indicates an important 
property of physiological systems, that they are relatively easy to understand because 
their elements are repeatable: the same components recur reliably, so that one can talk 
generically of ―a synapse‖. This is because biological systems are a set of self-
perpetuating and self-replicating systems, which are brought into being by evolution.  
In economics, one can similarly represent an economic system, e.g. that of capitalism, as 
a series of self-perpetuating and self-replicating systems. Evolutionary economics seeks 
an analogy with evolutionary biology, although its value is somewhat limited as the 
underlying processes (mechanisms) are quite different in the two cases. However, there 
are reasons to believe that one aspect of the analogy holds, that an economic system is 
also composed of repeatable elements such as firms, albeit with less uniformity and 
predictability than in the physiological case. It is further argued that the abstract 
characteristics of a self-perpetuating system can illuminate the properties of the economy, 
e.g. the aspects of capitalism that give it a uniquely dynamic (and volatile) character.  
In addition to the important differences between biological and economic ―evolution‖, the 
other striking difference is the centrality of agency in economics (albeit one that is 
ignored in mainstream microeconomic theory). Here too biological analogy, e.g. ant 
behaviour, has been used with some limited success to illuminate economics. A 
satisfactory account of economic phenomena is likely to require the fusion of physiology-
like concepts of the economic system with agency-based insights such as those that are 
accumulating in the relatively new sub-discipline of behavioural economics.  
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THE CHOICE BETWEEN EXPLANATORY AND DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES IN 
PHOTOELECTRICITY AND PIEZOELECTRICITY 
 
Shaul Katzir 
Bar-Ilan University 
 
Often scientists can chose between explanatory and descriptive (or phenomenological) 
theories. The latter describe the phenomena under consideration with a minimal number 
of laws without explaining them by a deeper effect or process and without determining 
the nature of the basic entities involved. The former often involve unproved hypotheses 
about underline processes and/or entities. Although they are of different kind, hardly ever 
one's choice of either kind of theories is based on a principle rejection of the other kind 
(the mature Pierre Duhem is an exception that proves the rule). General philosophical or 
methodological tendencies of the scientists have some influence, but the choice is 
primarily shaped by the advantages and disadvantages of the theories in their specific 
scientific context. 
In this talk I will employ my previous studies of piezoelectricity and photoelectricity to 
examine the different fates of the descriptive accounts for both phenomena. Discovered 
in the 1880s, both were 'boundary' phenomena between subdisciplines of physics. In both 
cases, early explanatory theories failed to account for further result, and alternative 
explanation were suggested. However, in piezoelectricity complicated molecular models 
were not adopted, while   a descriptive phenomenological theory of Voigt was widely 
accepted. This was not the case of Richardson's descriptive theory of  photoelectricity, 
even though in this field "classical" and semi-classical mechanisms contradicted 
observations, and Einstein's quantum hypothesis about the nature of  light, was rejected 
as too radical. 
I suggest the following main factors for the acceptance of the descriptive theory in one 
case and not the other: 
Voigt's theory had the advantage of being based on a small number of assumptions, 
which led to mathematical elegance and diminishes its arbitrariness, two appreciated 
characteristics. This was not the case with Richardson's theory which in addition involved 
questionable assumptions, and thus could not enjoy the non speculative secure basis, 
which is central advantage of phenomenological theories. 
The explanatory theories of piezoelectricity required complicated speculative models and 
unlikely structure of crystals, which were not supported by other scientific field. This is 
different from other cases. For example in the abnormal Zeeman effect, the motion of 
electrons in the atom, which was supported by many external observations, was used in 
(failed) attempts to explain the effect, and so here a phenomenological theory of Voigt 
received cold reception. 
Explanatory theories in piezoelectricity suggested no new testable relations (i.e. those 
that were not predicted already by the phenomenological theory). In  photoelectricity, the 
descriptive theory could only regain empirical relations predicted by the Einstein's 
hypothetical theory. Although logically the temporal order has no relevance to the 
acceptance of the theories in practice it had a clear influence . One reason for that is the 
feeling that later theories were adjusted to the desired results and is therefore too 
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arbitrary, without sufficient internal necessity. This can be expressed in a Popperian 
terms as a criteria for the falsifiability of the theory. 
Lastly of major significance was the process which the descriptive theories bypassed. 
When it was considered unknown due to missing details (as in piezoelectricity) a 
phenomenological theory was accepted. When physicists doubts that laws are missing or 
inadequate, they were not satisfied with such a solution. This was the case when no 
complicated structure could explain the observations, and when accumulation of evidence 
from different phenomena suggested that the problem should be tackled rather than 
circumvented. 
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COMPUTER SIMULATION AS EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
 
Jeff Kochan 
University of Alberta 
 
In this paper, I will consider the methodological status of computer simulation in the 
physical sciences. Specifically, I will focus on the question of whether or not computer 
simulation can be justifiably categorized as a method of experimentation. 
It is unclear whether computer simulation, when considered against received philosophies 
of experimentation, qualifies as an experimental method. Ian Hacking, for example, has 
argued that a key feature of scientific experiments is their intervention in the physical 
world. This criterion would seem to exclude simulation from being counted as an 
experimental method. However, Hacking‘s criterion is perhaps too narrow. It excludes a 
number of scientific methods which are conventionally described as experiments, but 
which do not obviously intervene in nature. I propose to compare computer simulation to 
one such very well-established form of experimentation: namely, thought experiments. 
Thought experiments have played an extremely important role in the development of 
modern science. By drawing on the philosophy of thought experiments, I aim to sketch-
out the basis for a philosophical account of computer simulation as an emerging 
experimental method. 
There has been a debate in recent years over whether or not thought experiments, as acts 
of imagination rather than of intervention, can yield new facts. Do thought experiments 
provide non-empirical access to the world? John Norton says no, arguing that thought 
experiments are nothing but ordinary, empirically grounded arguments in rhetorical 
disguise. James Robert Brown counters with a Platonic account of thought experiments 
as providing a priori access to the world. Richard Arthur cuts a middle path between 
these two positions. He argues that thought experiments do articulate new facts, but only 
by explicating tacitly held, empirically grounded presuppositions and exposing 
contradictions implicit in received theory. In this, Arthur‘s position is similar to that of 
Kuhn, who adds the stronger claim that theory and world are jointly implicated in the 
contradictions uncovered by thought experiments. Theory can house contradiction 
because the world can be experienced in contradictory ways. By exposing these 
contradictions, thought experiments bring consistency to our theories and coherence to 
our world. A similar claim might also be made for simulation experiments. Like thought 
experiments, simulation experiments can yield new facts by resolving contradictions 
implicit in the way we experience and theorise the world. In a certain sense, simulation 
experiments might be described as computer-aided thought experiments. To develop this 
claim, I will draw on the philosophy of technology, where it is commonly argued that 
technology is the enhancement and extension of human capacities. A hammer enhances 
and extends physical strength; a telephone, the ability to communicate. Insofar as thought 
experiments are essentially acts of imagination, I suggest that computer simulation 
experiments can be described as enhancing and extending the power of human 
imagination. On this basis, one might reasonably speculate that simulation experiments 
could one day play as central a role in scientific research as the historic role played by 
thought experiments.
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THE INFLUENCE OF MEASURING TECHNOLOGY ON MODEL BUILDING IN 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY  
 
Ulrich Krohs 
University of Hamburg 
 
Until the late 1990ies, models of molecular processes on the cellular level were based on 
kinetic data of a few components of a biochemical pathway. The set of parameters 
included in such models remained limited for two reasons. Firstly, the processes were 
usually modeled as dynamic systems, and it was neither practical nor desirable to make 
these systems too complicated. Otherwise they would have lost their predictive power. 
Secondly, the experimental methods used for data collection allowed for determination of 
only a limited set of parameters in acceptable time. The data were often very precise but 
the measurements required purification of the molecular components of a pathway. So 
there was a well-established correlation of experimental and modelling techniques. Both 
concentrated on isolated pathways within the metabolic network of a cell.  
The recent availability of high throughput analytical methods, primarily developed in the 
fields of genomics and proteomics, gave rise to a dramatic change of the situation. 
Meanwhile, it is easy to produce a flood of data not only about the structure, but also 
about the dynamics of genetic and metabolic systems of whole cells. Subsets of such data 
could be used in several cases to refine models of the ―classical‖ type, for example the 
models of the circadian clock and of signalling pathways. However, the new 
experimental methods also gave rise to completely new modelling strategies that allow to 
utilize whole data sets of ―-omic‖ dimension. The new models describe no longer isolated 
pathways but the dynamics of networks as wholes.  
I will discuss the change in model building as mediated by the availability of the new 
measuring technology. Interestingly, the data gathered by the new techniques are much 
less precise than those obtainable with the older methods. The new large-scale models 
nevertheless allow for new insights into and better explanation of cellular processes. The 
focus of explanation, however, has changed. I will furthermore discuss this change of the 
explanatory focus that has occurred with the change of the experimental methods. 
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THE RE-CONFIGURATION OF BAYESIANISM IN RECENT STATISTICAL 
PRACTICE 
 
Johannes Lenhard 
Bielefeld University 
 
The development of statistical theory and practice has been structured by applications 
nearly all of the time since their origins. At the beginning of the 20th century, the 
influential contributions of R.A. Fisher, J. Neyman, E. Pearson and others established 
frequentism as the leading philosophy in the statistical practice of the natural sciences 
and in mathematical statistics itself. Bayesianism played only a minor role there, 
notwithstanding its more prominent standing in philosophy of science. Recently, 
however, it seems to perform a significant upswing – think, for instance, of the so-called 
―empirical Bayes‖ approach now widely practised in disciplines that formerly adhered to 
a frequentist stance. Hence one may ask: Is scientific practise changing its philosophy? If 
so, what are the reasons and driving forces? 
It will be argued that essential parts of Bayesian philosophy have been given up by 
current approaches, although they still use the label ―Bayes‖. The main claim will be that 
one can observe a convergence or unification of frequentist and Bayesian elements that 
formerly presented themselves as incompatible or mutually opposing each other. This 
unification, however, is not a theoretical but rather a pragmatic one driven by 
instrumentation. This claim will be argued for by analyzing two examples of recent 
approaches, namely ―empirical Bayes‖ and ―Bayesian calibration‖. 
Both are part of a general development: New technologies, high-throughput devices, 
satellite data, microarrays, etc. produce huge amounts of data while at the same time 
increasingly complex models and simulations are applied in a growing number of 
scientific fields. Classical approaches encounter difficulties in dealing with this situation. 
By taking advantage of new instrumentation (computer technology, including simulation 
and visualisation) recent statistical practice is going to change fundamental assumptions 
in statistical philosophy. 
Empirical distributions can be dealt with directly – without modelling and formalizing a 
prior distribution. First, the necessary amount of data that describe the distribution is 
often available and, secondly, computer methods can deal with them directly. Thus 
radically simplifying models of data may become dispensable – changing the very 
rationale of modelling. So-called calibration techniques that are employed in complex 
models of, for instance, climate science will also be discussed. They treat prior 
distributions not as representing knowledge that has meaning and significance 
independently from the observed data and underlying models, but rather as parameters 
that are varied systematically to achieve a good fit to the data. Again, this approach is 
rendered possible only by computing techniques while, at the same time, simulation 
models also call for this kind of approach. This is because the internal dynamics of these 
models often remains partly opaque so that it may be impossible to attribute meaning to 
them independently from the model‘s performance. The paper will discuss how 
mathematical/ statistical instrumentation and practice mutually influence one another. 
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PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE FOR ADVISING PUBLIC POLICY: ON 
THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF ETHICAL CODES FOR SCIENTIFIC 
POLICY ADVICE 
 
Justus Lentsch 
Bielefeld University 
 
In this paper, I will explore the prospects and pitfalls of ethical or professional codes of 
conduct in scientific policy advising. Science is still the major institution for producing 
knowledge pertaining to political decision making and regulation. As such, it remains 
indispensible for approaching the urgent environmental, societal and political problems 
our society currently faces. However, the role of science in providing advice to political 
decision makers and to the public for managing public policy problems such as the BSE 
crisis, nuclear power, genetically engineered food or animal diseases has given reason for 
widespread disappointment with regard to the quality and integrity of the advice given. 
One of the most challenging problems is the role of academic scientists having financial 
or partisan interests in the assessment of drugs, toxic chemicals etc. (cf. Krimsky 2003). 
Hence, developing procedures and guidelines for responsible and scientifically based 
policy advice – such as the British Chief Scientific Adviser‘s Guidelines – is now a major 
concern to scientific experts and policy makers alike (cf. Lentsch / Weingart 2006). 
 
However, the task of formulating ethical or professional codes is not an easy one. This is, 
at least partly, because scientific experts have to serve two principals when advising 
policy: Firstly, they have the responsibility to provide expertise in a way that promotes 
autonomous decision-making on the part of their clients (cf. Elliott 2006). Secondly, they 
have to consider the needs and the concerns of the society that funds the scientific 
enterprise. In classical professions, an ethical code of conduct is what makes a profession 
deserve the trust on which society‘s support should base (cf. Davis 1994). However, 
responsible conduct in science is more than simply a matter of following everyday ethical 
imperatives (Kitcher 2004). Moreover, the production of scientific expertise differs 
essentially from basic science – with regards to objects and methods as well as to its aims 
and core values (cf. Jasanoff 1990). Hence, we will have to ask how to account for the 
different rationales and responsibilities in formulating such codes for scientific expert 
advising. 
 
On the theoretical level, I will draw on recent work in social epistemology (cf. Kitcher 
2001; Kourany 2007; Longino 2002), science studies (e.g. Jasanoff 2005, 2006) and the 
ethics of science (cf. Resnik 1998). Whereas the issues of what role values play in 
science (cf. e.g. Douglas 2000; Longino 2002) as well as questions about the values of 
science (Kitcher 2001; for critical comments on Kitcher cf. e.g. Dupré 2004) receive 
increasing attention, questions of the impact of institutional arrangements have rarely 
been addressed. Looking at the rationale and the guiding principles for formulating 
ethical or professional codes for the production of scientific expertise for public policy, 
this paper takes a first step to close this lacuna. On the level of science policy, I will 
discuss experiences from an ongoing project of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of 
Sciences and Humanities. The Academy undertakes to devise such guidelines, thereby 
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addressing primarily the role of scientific expert advisers, instead of making prescriptions 
about the appropriate utilisation of scientific expertise by policy makers, as in most of the 
other guidelines. Building on this example, I will further discuss the role academies of 
science should play in devising guidelines to promote the responsible conduct of 
scientific expert advising. I will conclude with some considerations on the prospects and 
chances as well as on the pitfalls and limits of such ethical or professional codes as a 
valuable instrument not only for policing scientific expert advisers in cases of fraud, 
scientific misconduct and conflicts of interests, but also for encouraging scientific experts 
to reflect upon how to provide policy advice in an ethically and politically responsible 
way. 
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WHAT IMPLICATIONS DOES THEORY-LADEN OBSERVATION HAVE FOR 
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE?  
 
Matthew D. Lund 
Rowan University  
 
The thesis that observation inevitably contains some non-testable elements, i.e. that 
observation is theory-laden, is ordinarily associated with the critique of the logical 
positivist model of science. However, most post-positivist treatments of theory-laden 
observation were much more concerned with addressing the apparent subjectivity brought 
into science by theory-laden observation than with its consequences for scientific 
practice. Thus, the post-positivist discussions of theory-laden observation were primarily 
devoted to logical problems of traditional epistemology which just happen to arise in 
scientific contexts, but which could come up in other contexts as well. I argue that this 
preoccupation with issues that abstract away from the actual practice of science not only 
robs us of interesting and crucial insights into the workings of our most successful 
epistemic enterprise, but fundamentally misrepresents the motivations of the philosopher 
who first put the term ―theory-laden‖ into the philosopher of science‘s vocabulary, N.R. 
Hanson.  
 
Hanson‘s discussion of theory-laden observation was the first step in his project of 
developing a philosophy of science to account not merely for science‘s logical structure, 
but for its historical, practical, and conceptual aspects as well. Despite its historical 
importance, Hanson‘s account of theory-laden observation has presented some challenges 
in exegesis. I argue that Hanson‘s account of observation owes a great deal to Pierce and 
that if we pay attention to the pragmaticist elements in his account, we can extract an 
account of theory-laden observation appropriate for understanding scientific practice. In 
recent years, a number of philosophers have made considerable progress toward 
achieving a notion of theory-laden observation capable of making sense of scientific 
practice (Heidelberger, Radder, and Norris). Heidelberger, in particular, has presented a 
new typology of theory-laden observation (drawing on Kuhn and Duhem as well as 
Hanson) that pushes Hanson‘s original intuitions toward greater precision and usefulness. 
 
I develop the following account of theory-laden observation based on the views of 
Hanson, Peirce, and Heidelberger. I start with Peirce‘s idea that entertainment of a 
concept entails the truth of a set of conditional statements about experience and practice, 
i.e. commitment to a theory has some in principle testable implications. However, if this 
were what concepts actually amount to, there would be no difficulties with theory-laden 
observation since we could just test all of a concept‘s implications. However, there are a 
number of factors that block this inclusive conditional understanding of concepts from 
usefully applying to certain cases; the most important impediments are psychological, 
historical, and practical. Thus, one may be prevented from examining certain testable 
implications of a theory because one‘s cognitive limitations do not allow those 
implications to be grasped. I show that historical cases of dispute over observation 
between scientists were resolved by appeal to testable implications, though it was often a 
task of some difficulty to produce a list of practical test implications. Blondlot‘s 
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observations of N-Rays were theory-laden and he avoided, for psychological reasons, 
examining certain test implications he knew to follow from the theory of N-Rays. 
Nineteenth century observational astronomy was fraught with worries about observation 
and though the observations of individuals differed, the differences were eventually 
found not to be due to revisable theoretical commitments; Bessel‘s development of the 
notion of the ―personal equation‖ was the result of serious consideration of the testable 
implications that would result from certain theoretical explanations of error.
  80 
ULTIMATE AND PROXIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: 
PLURALITY OR INTEGRATION? 
 
Caterina Marchionni  
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Jack Vromen 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
The behavioral sciences are characterized by a multiplicity of forms of explanation. 
Mayr‘s famous distinction between ultimate and proximate explanations has been 
generally invoked to make sense of at least part of this plurality. Whereas evolutionary 
theorizing explains human behavior by appeal to evolutionary forces (such as, notably, 
natural selection) working in the past, proximate explanations explain by appeal to 
current cognitive and psychological mechanisms. Each is held to be a legitimate form of 
explanation, and to be indispensable for a full understanding of behavior. At the same 
time the belief in a single unified theory of human behavior has revived in recent years 
(e.g. Glimcher and Rustichini 2004; Gintis 2006), suggesting that evolutionary and 
proximate explanations can, and perhaps should, be integrated. In this paper we enter the 
debate by scrutinizing the relation between proximate explanations and ultimate 
explanations of human cooperative behavior. We show that there are different ways in 
which ultimate and proximate explanations complement each other, not all of which 
equally support plurality of explanations. First, in some cases ultimate explanations are 
thought to directly account for behavior (for example, Ken Binmore‘s game-theoretical 
account of reciprocity). Second, ultimate explanations are held to explain behavior only 
indirectly, that is, by explaining proximate mechanisms (for example, Robert Frank‘s 
account of emotions as commitment devices and evolutionary psychology). Finally, in 
still other cases, there is only one explanation that appeals to both proximate mechanisms 
and evolutionary forces to explain current proximate mechanisms, and thereby behavior 
(for example, dual inheritance co-evolution theory). These three kinds of 
complementarity correspond to distinct ways in which different approaches (both within 
and across disciplines) can relate to each other in providing understanding of cooperative 
behavior: in particular, the approaches tend be increasingly integrated as the kind of 
complementarity gets stronger. If ultimate and proximate explanations both account for 
behavior but do so differently, then evolutionary and ‗proximate‘ approaches can proceed 
without taking much notice of each other as long as their explanations are compatible. If 
ultimate explanations explain proximate causes, then ultimate explanation helps in 
identifying proximate causes (―from function to form‖) and, conversely, the detection of 
proximate causes provide an empirical test for ultimate causes (―from form to function‖). 
In the third case, different approaches and fields are integrated to produce more complete 
explanations. The pursuit of more complete explanations is here driven by the recognition 
that ultimate explanations that completely disregard proximate causes, for example, 
might seriously distort the actual causal history. The current trend in the behavioral 
sciences is to opt for the second or third position, and hence seems to be a trend towards 
greater integration rather than plurality. The general lesson to be drawn is that finer-grain 
analyses of complementarities between actual scientific explanations are needed to 
illuminate kinds of inter-theoretical and inter-fields relationships, and the degree to which 
they support plurality vis-à-vis unity. 
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WHAT IS COGNITION? A VIEW FROM SCIENTIFIC PRACTICES 
 
Sergio F. Martínez 
UNAM 
 
How do scientific practices embed and account for cognition? Two families of answers 
are found in the literature; we call these Cartesianism and Interactionism. Cartesianism is 
the classic account: cognition is the individual-level processing of representations. 
Scientific practices are communal processes that are aggregations of these individual-
level processes. Philip Kitcher understands scientific practices in this way. Furthermore, 
cognition is seen to involve natural kinds of processes that belong to clear and distinct 
individuals. A theory of cognition as individual-level ―problem-solving,‖ as developed by 
Herbert Simon and recently by Gerd Gigerenzer, exemplifies this atomistic manner of 
understanding cognition.  
On the other hand, Interactionism, which we defend, claims that scientific practices 
structure a variety of norms and strategies of inquiry. Joseph Rouse analyzes scientific 
practices along these lines. In addition, under our view, cognition is understood as 
including both individual and social processes. Individual-level processes of cognition we 
argue, contra Simon, cannot be individualized as natural kinds because the identification 
of such processes co-varies with different scientific practices. Furthermore, we claim that 
the irreducibly social processes of cognition are coordinated, and (to an important extent) 
constituted, by scientific practices. Such practices evolve as part of distinct historical 
research communities. Thus, cognition is distributed.  
The operative contrasts between Cartesianism and Interactionism, then, include: (1) a 
focus on (a) cognition as the processing of representations occurring within individuals 
vs. (b) distributed cognition as an interactive activity taking place at multiple levels (e.g., 
agents as individuals, research groups, etc.), (2) the classification of the processes of 
cognition as (a) natural kinds vs. (b) kinds dependent both on social context and on the 
purposes for which such processes are identified for a particular investigation, (3) 
understanding cognition as (a) a purely ―internal‖ process vs. (b) a complex of processes 
situated both ―within‖ and ―among‖ agents embedded in a variety of environments co-
conformed by the processes themselves.  
The Interactionism we wish to defend regarding cognition emerges from a concern with 
the development of a truly social epistemology, and is strongly inspired by interactionist 
views proposed by researchers as different as Rodney Brooks in AI/robotics, Susan 
Oyama in developmental psychology and developmental biology, and John Dewey in 
philosophy.
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ETHICAL VALUES, SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Isabelle Peschard 
University of Twente. 
 
Discussions of the role value judgements play in scientific activity generally start by 
assuming a categorization of values in distinct kinds: epistemic or cognitive and others, 
political, social, ethical. Second, non-epistemic values are meant to influence, at most, the 
choice between theories or research programs. Third, this influence would not affect the 
epistemic/representational content of scientific knowledge (Lacey), but would entail 
however, fourthly, the inability of epistemology to account for the conditions of scientific 
knowledge (Laudan). 
I will call these four points into question. I will consider ethical value judgements, in 
relation to judgments of responsibility, significance and negligibility, as judgments 
stating what is important to us, and argue that even though ethical they can have an 
epistemic function. I will take up two specific cases of development of models, both 
addressing a ‗knowledge-phenomenon‘: in cognitive science I will contrast models 
pertaining to representational and to embodied theories of cognition (Varela). In social 
science I will contrast deficit and participation models of public understanding of science 
(Wynne, Jasanoff). In these two cases, I want to show that ethical values can first 
influence the conception of the phenomena to be explained, what has to be accounted for, 
and then, through judgments of significance, influence the identification of what has to be 
taken into account, what kind of data count as relevant. These judgments condition the 
kind of possible models for the phenomenon under study. Furthermore, through 
judgements of negligibility ethical values can influence the assessment of models of a 
given kind. But if ethical values contribute to the epistemic/representational content of 
these models, does that imply an inability of epistemology to apply to scientific 
knowledge?  
I will contend that it only shows a deficiency of traditional epistemology, oblivious to the 
conditions of formation of knowledge, and stresses the need for philosophy of science to 
enlarge its vision of epistemology and to benefit from recent developments in this 
domain. The shift in philosophy of science towards the conditions of scientific practice 
and formation of scientific knowledge, that is associated with the perception of the 
epistemic function of ‗non-epistemic‘ values, was mirrored in epistemology by a shift 
towards the conditions of acquisition and enunciation of knowledge claims and beliefs.  
Contextual (DeRose) and virtue epistemologies (Code, Zagzebski), as developed in the 
two last decades, show the epistemological relevance of considerations relative to the 
epistemic context in the evaluation of knowledge claims and to the intellectual virtues of 
the epistemic agents in the formation of beliefs. The epistemological legitimacy of such 
considerations provides philosophy of science with a promising epistemological 
framework for conceiving the epistemic relevance of ethical value judgements in the 
production of scientific knowledge. 
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SEEKING REPRESENTATIONS OF PHENOMENA: PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
MODELS 
 
Demetris P. Portides 
University of Cyprus 
 
Scientific models come in various guises that over time philosophers have analyzed and 
distinguished into different categories. One kind of model that, in my view, has not been 
adequately scrutinized by philosophers of science (notable exceptions are Cartwright 
1983, Hartmann 1999, Morrison 1998, 1999) and which deserves more weight than that 
attributed to it in the literature, is phenomenological models. Phenomenological models 
are one species of mathematical models constructed by physicists to apply theory to 
phenomena. Being a species of mathematical models, their representational function, 
their relation to theory and to phenomena, their function as sources of knowledge, their 
methods of construction and more generally their importance in physics, have been 
overshadowed by another species of mathematical models, namely theory-driven models. 
The focus on theory-driven models could be attributed to the philosophical demand that 
questions pertaining to the uses of scientific models and foundational questions about 
theory structure should be addressed within a framework that assumes the unity of theory 
and models. This approach is manifested both by the Received View and by the Semantic 
View of scientific theories, both of which, it could be argued, fail to adequately address 
the theory/experiment relation and the representational function of scientific models. 
Attention to phenomenological modeling, however, could enhance our understanding on 
both of these matters. 
 
I argue that phenomenological modeling can be best understood as a process that abides 
by theoretical constraints which are in constant interplay with experimentally determined 
results and progressively changing physical intuitions about the models‘ target physical 
systems. This idea is demonstrated by an analysis of the single-particle shell model of 
nuclear structure. I also draw attention to the fact that phenomenological models are 
distinct entities from theory-driven models that cannot be viewed as approximations of 
the latter. Thus if they represent their targets it is in virtue of their explanatory power and 
not because of their closeness to theory. I describe the construction of the single-particle 
shell model with spin-orbit coupling of the nuclear structure, and try to illustrate the 
complexities involved in rendering the model a (partial) representation of the nucleus. I 
choose this particular model to emphasize the importance of phenomenological thinking, 
because it is a model that relies also on theory, and thus demonstrates my thesis that it is 
theory together with phenomenological considerations that render the model a 
representation of the nucleus. It does not belong to that class of phenomenological 
models, such as the liquid-drop model of nuclear structure, which demonstrate a high 
degree of theory independence. The latter kind, although of equal significance, would 
guide my argument away from the interplay between theoretical considerations and 
phenomenological thinking in scientific model construction, that I wish to highlight. The 
construction process of the single-particle shell model shows the role played by the 
phenomenological underpinnings of the model in providing the latter with its explanatory 
power and thus its representational capacity. In fact, the process clearly demonstrates that 
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without its phenomenological features the model cannot be rendered a representation of 
the nucleus.
  85 
METAPHORS AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY  
 
Jarmo Pulkkinen 
University of Oulu 
 
Traditionally the initial act of inventing a new scientific idea was considered to be 
irrelevant to philosophy of science. It was believed that scientific discovery is based on 
either induction from data or lucky hunch. For its part, history of science provided 
numerous anecdotes in which scientific discoveries were explained by sudden ―flashes of 
insight‖.  Nowadays it is widely accepted that metaphors are important in the early stages 
of scientific discovery. They often provide the first vague hunch or insight into ―how 
things are‖. When metaphors are used as cognitive instruments, the unknown (target 
domain) is explained and understood with the known (source domain).  
These metaphors can be classified with the help of their source domain. First, the source 
domain can be the physical world, i.e. living and nonliving material objects (e.g. 
―electron is a wave‖). Second, the source domain can be the world of mental states, i.e. 
the world of subjective experiences. For example, in contemporary particle physics quark 
has a ―colour‖. Third, the source domain can be the realm of social relations, institutions, 
and structures (e.g. Plato‘s midwife metaphor or ―molecular chaperone‖ in modern 
biology). Next, the source domain can be the abstract product of human mind, e.g. 
scientific concepts and theories (e.g.  ―DNA is a code‖). Finally, the source domain can 
be technology (e.g. ―mind is a digital computer‖). 
Generally speaking, metaphors derived from different source domains provide different 
kinds of conceptual frameworks. Consequently, some source domains have been more 
important than others with regard to scientific discovery. For example, a source domain is 
the better the more we know about it. In particular, we have a very thorough knowledge 
of artifacts, i.e. maker‘s knowledge. As a result, they are very useful in our attempts to 
explain the unknown with the known. Moreover, unlike inanimate nature and living 
organism, technology develops constantly. New artifacts can be used as new and possibly 
insightful metaphors. 
On the one hand, scientific metaphors are based on the ―lucky guesses‖ of a particular 
scientist. On the other hand, the use of metaphors, like all other human activities, relies 
on existing material and other resources. Thus, the setting in which a discovery occurs is 
important. The environment we live in becomes constantly ―richer‖, i.e. there are more 
possibilities to create new insightful scientific metaphors.  
The classification of the different source domains of metaphor offers an interesting 
methodological framework that can be applied in history of science. In this respect, 
metaphor has also other interesting properties. A metaphor suppresses some details, 
emphasises others, — in short, it organizes our view of the unknown phenomenon. For 
example, machines may be described in terms of mathematical relations among their 
moving and stationary parts. When using a machine metaphor, these mathematical 
relations can be transferred from the source domain of technology to the target domain of 
physical world. Consequently, natural phenomenona can be subjected to quantitative 
description.  
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SIMPLE OR SIMPLISTIC? SCIENTISTS VIEWS ON OCCAM‟S RAZOR 
 
Hauke Riesch 
University College London 
 
Many well-known popular accounts of science, such as Sagan‘s famous ―baloney 
detection kit‖ generally portray Occam‘s razor and the value of simplicity for theory 
choice and as a demarcation criterion, very positively. That simplicity is a good thing in 
science is apparently one of the least controversial philosophical concepts – debates on 
Occam‘s razor centre more on how it can be justified, rather than on whether it should be 
justified at all. 
In a more systematic survey of 24 recently published popular science books (whose 
authors are scientists), the picture of what scientists themselves think about simplicity 
becomes a little bit more complex. While there is a general tone of acceptance of 
Occam‘s razor, there are also people who disagree with the whole concept. In the books, 
Occam‘s razor visibly fulfils several rhetorical functions of ―boundary-work‖ between 
science and pseudoscience or of helping to close an argument by appeal to 
(philosophical) authority. There is a discernible difference between Occam‘s razor as a 
demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience like Sagan does, and simplicity 
(without mentioning Occam‘s razor by name) as a criterion for theory choice within 
science. Underneath that surface however, there is a rather complex and nuanced 
spectrum of opinions and representations of Occam‘s razor, of what simplicity actually is, 
and of the structure of the world and of science. 
The question of the value of simplicity was then put to practising scientists themselves in 
a series of 40 semi-structured interviews. Again the range of opinions vary enormously 
from a ―gut-feeling‖ acceptance that looking for simplicity in science will yield results 
that are more likely to be true, to an outright rejection of the principle, stating that it may 
even have done more harm than good in science. In short, people‘s understanding of 
Occam‘s razor and simplicity, its usefulness for science, and what it actually says about 
the world or about our way of making sense of it, varies greatly. 
In the light of the range of representations and opinions of Occam‘s razor, and the 
variations in which it is discussed in the different contexts and disciplines, I will explore 
what possible usefulness it still has as a normative philosophical principle. If Occam‘s 
razor is to retain its place as an authoritative ―baloney detector‖, then it must have some 
agreement with how scientists themselves understand their work. As popular science is in 
many ways the public face of science, the way it represents science should at least not be 
too far removed from the practice of it. In this context, Occam‘s razor, despite its 
intuitive appeal, may not be so useful for popular science after all.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS FOR MEASURING UNEMPLOYMENT  
 
Peter Rodenburg 
University of Amsterdam 
 
This paper provides an analysis of how economists and statisticians built (or have build) 
measuring instruments for various concept of unemployment, and how this process 
deviates from the normative, dominant theory of measurement in the philosophy of 
science, the Representational Theory of Measurement.     
 
The Representational Theory of Measurement is the dominant theory of measurement in 
the philosophy of science. This theory, which decent from Logical Positivist‘ thinking, 
employs a set-theoretical approach to measurement, and defines measurement as bringing 
about a non-degenerative isomorphic (strict one-to-one) mapping of a set of empirical 
relations on to a set of numerical relations. However, due to its strict formal and 
normative nature, this theory has very little guidance to offer to practitioners in the field 
of how to establish such an isomorphism and so to do sound measurement in practice. In 
addition to that, does the Representational Theory of Measurement fails to provide a 
satisfactory account of measurement errors.  
In this paper I will investigate how scientists and statisticians have constructed measuring 
devices in practice by analyzing which ways they used to bring about (and judge) the 
isomorphic mappings embedded in the design and construction of measuring instruments, 
and which resources – not incorporated in the Representational Theory of Measurement – 
are needed to get the measuring devices to work. In order to do so I have conducted a 
number of case studies in economics, where scientist tried to measure particular concepts 
of unemployment, such as unemployment in the Netherlands from 1900-1940, cyclical 
unemployment and the ‗non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment‘.  
Based on these case studies the paper argues that the requirement of an isomorphism is in 
fact an idealisation and, in practice, is replaced by a representation of an invariant-as-
possible relationship between the phenomenon and numbers. A variety of representations 
of invariant relations can fulfil this purpose: causal relations, correlations, regressions, 
stable mechanisms, diagrams, models, standardized quantitative rules and so on. The 
paper argues further that classification (and division) – which turned out to play an 
important role in concept formation – is not just a pre-requirement for measurement, but 
is in fact a rudimentary form of measurement. Finally, the paper provides some 
suggestions of how a positive theory of measurement and a theory of measurement errors 
might be developed, based on Bogen and Woodward‘s (1988) phenomenon-data 
distinction.
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WHAT DO WE ACTUALLY LEARN FROM VIRTUAL WORLDS?  THE LIMITS OF 
COMPUTER EXPERIMENTS AND SIMULATIONS IN ASTROPHYSICS AND 
COSMOLOGY. 
 
Stéphanie Ruphy 
Université de Provence 
 
Computer simulations have become a major tool of investigation to learn about real-
world systems for which data are inexistent or very sparse. It is especially the case in 
astrophysics and cosmology, where computer simulations function as experimental tools 
by producing data used to test specific hypotheses concerning past or distant events and 
processes we have no direct access to. This widespread use of computer simulations in 
scientific practice today raises two related epistemological issues. First, how reliable is 
the knowledge produced by a simulation, knowing that a simulation does not simply 
inherit the epistemic credentials of its underlying theories? Second, to what extent can a 
simulation function as a virtual experiment?  
Drawing on my past practice of model building in astrophysics (Ruphy 1996, Ruphy et 
al. 1996, 1997), I will first put to the fore features of computer simulations of complex 
real-world phenomena that directly bear on the issue of their epistemic credentials, but 
which have not yet received proper philosophical attention. I will explain how, what I call 
the « path-dependency » and the plasticity of a simulation, undermine a realistic take on 
the results it produces. I‘ll show in particular how these features account for the 
embarrassing epistemological situation created by the existence of a persistent plurality 
of incompatible but equally empirically successful modelings of a given phenomenon. I‘ll 
also explain why path-dependency and plasticity support a non-realistic interpretation of 
the stability and empirical success of a model or simulation when new data come in. To 
back up these claims, I‘ll present in some detail two case studies, one in cosmology and 
one in galactic astrophysics. 
In light of the previous analysis, I will then critically examine the use of simulations as 
virtual experiments. I will show in particular that computer simulations can only teach us 
something about plausible worlds (i.e. world pictures consistent both with the 
observations at hand and with our current theoretical knowledge), but there is no good 
reason to believe that they teach us something about the actual world. Otherwise put, 
computer simulations can provide us only with simplified and stylized versions of what 
possibly is, and not of what actually is.  So that only at the price of confusing plausible 
real-world systems and actual real-world systems can cosmologists talk of experimental 
test in the same sense as physicists do, that is, as a mean to learn something about our 
world. I conclude by emphasizing that a close attention to the practice of computer 
simulations calls for epistemological prudence and for a reassessment of the epistemic 
goals actually achieved by computer simulations of complex real-world phenomena. 
 
Ruphy, Stéphanie (1996), ―Contribution à l‘étude de la distribution spatiale des étoiles du disque de la 
Galaxie à l‘aide des données DENIS‖, PhD Dissertation, Paris VI / Paris Observatory. 
Ruphy, Stéphanie et al. (1996), ―New Determination of the Disc Scale Length and the Radial Cutoff in the 
Anticenter with DENIS Data.‖, Astronomy and Astrophysics, 313, L21-L24. 
Ruphy, Stéphanie et al. (1997), ―Stellar Populations and Inhomogeneities of the Galactic Plane from 
DENIS Star Counts.‖ Astronomy and Astrophysics, 326: 597-607. 
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EVIDENCE-BASED PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
 
Joachim Schummer 
Australian National University 
 
By developing ideas of how scientific practice could be or ought to be, speculative 
philosophy of science has always been running the risk of loosing contact to the actual 
scientific practice. Even if speculative ideas are supported by individual historical case 
studies, it remains unclear if such ideas have any descriptive meaning regarding the 
current scientific practice or other historical cases. This paper starts with discussing 
methodological issues that any philosophical approach to scientific practice is confronted 
with. With reference to Max Weber‘s methodology, I argue that speculative philosophy 
of science, rather than describing scientific practice, provides useful conceptual and 
category frameworks for studying scientific practice. However, because of the sheer size 
of contemporary science, which produces several million papers per year, any such study 
also needs to be informed by empirical and statistical methodology if it aims at 
descriptive results of general significance. Evidence-based philosophy of science 
combines both approach by employing speculative philosophy as a conceptual framework 
for conducting empirical studies. 
The second part of this paper presents some results of evidence-based philosophy of 
science from a series of earlier studies on the methodology of synthetic chemistry [1]. 
Synthetic chemistry is particularly interesting because, owing to its traditional focus on 
the practice of synthesis, it has largely escaped the attention of speculative philosophy of 
science, despite being the model of many flourishing disciplines, like synthetic biology 
and materials science. I will demonstrate that by using the results of speculative 
philosophy as a framework for conducting empirical studies of science, we can develop a 
much richer and more accurate picture of the methodologies in scientific practice. 
 
[1] Schummer: J.: ―Scientometric Studies on Chemistry I: The Exponential Growth of Chemical 
Substances, 1800-1995‖, Scientometrics, 39 (1997), 107-123; ―Scientometric Studies on Chemistry II: 
Aims and Methods of Producing new Chemical Substances‖, Scientometrics, 39 (1997), 125-140; 
―Challenging Standard Distinctions between Science and Technology: The Case of Preparative 
Chemistry‖, Hyle, 3 (1997), 81-94; ―The Impact of Instrumentation on Chemical Species Identity‖, in: P. 
Morris (ed.): From Classical to Modern Chemistry: The Instrumental Revolution, Cambridge: Royal 
Society of Chemistry, 2002, pp. 188-211; ―Why do Chemists Perform Experiments?‖, in: D. Sobczynska, P. 
Zeidler & E. Zielonacka-Lis (eds.), Chemistry in the Philosophical Melting Pot, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
2004, pp. 395-410. 
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RELIABILITY, VALIDITY AND THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCESS: A 
NEUROBIOLOGICAL CASE STUDY 
 
Jacqueline Sullivan 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
Reliability has traditionally been characterized by philosophers of science as a virtue of 
various aspects of experimentation including scientific methods and techniques, 
experimental arrangements, data and knowledge claims. I develop an account of 
reliability that restricts reliability ascriptions to processes involved in the production of 
scientific data. On my account, a data production process is reliable just so long as it 
results in statistically analyzable data that can be used as evidence for knowledge claims 
about effects produced in the laboratory. I use a case study from the neurobiology of 
learning and memory to show that if an investigator wants a data production process to be 
reliable, measures are taken to build such reliability directly into an experimental design 
and its adjoining protocol. In this way, the design and protocol can be understood to 
specify an idealized process type. Subsequently, when that process type is implemented 
repeatedly in the laboratory, steps are taken to ensure that each individual instantiation of 
the process type exhibits its fundamental and idealized features. In developing my 
account of reliability, I appeal to Goldman's (1979, 1986, 1994) process reliabilism as 
well as Woodward's (2000) and Mayo's (1996, 2000) accounts of the reliability of 
experiment. I identify what I take to be problems for applying Woodward's and Mayo's 
accounts of reliability to actual cases of experimentation in the biological sciences and 
show that my account overcomes such problems.  
While the reliability of experimental processes is a primary goal of an investigator, 
achieving reliability often comes only at the cost of sacrificing the achievement of 
another desirable goal of experimentation namely, the validity of interpretive claims 
made on the basis of data obtained in the laboratory. I define validity in accordance with 
the ordinary language definition, as a feature that an interpretive claim has just in case 
that claim has a sound basis and is appropriate given the circumstances or context to 
which it is applied. I use the neurobiological study of learning in order to illustrate how 
an express commitment to achieving the goal of reliability has resulted in the invalidity of 
mechanistic claims about learning emanating from this area of research. I provide a set of 
guidelines geared to function to maintain the reliability and increase the validity of those 
neurobiological experiments under consideration. The proposals that I make rely on 
methodological tools that have been proposed historically by experimental psychologists 
and more recently, by cognitive psychologists. I claim that given the fact that validity has 
different parameters, any solutions must proceed in a piecemeal fashion. I arrive at the 
conclusion that at best we can achieve some middle-ground in terms of guaranteeing 
simultaneously the reliability of data production and any given parameter of the validity 
of interpretation. This coincides with what Galison (1987), Hacking (1983; 1991) and 
Cartwright (1983; 1999) have claimed about other laboratory and non-laboratory 
sciences.
  91 
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF LITERARY PARADIGMS: NEW 
APPROACHES TO LITERATURE AND SCIENCE 
 
Priya Venkatesan 
Dartmouth Medical School 
 
I have been intensively involved in laboratory investigation in a molecular biology 
laboratory for the past two years at Dartmouth Medical School. This engagement in 
science is not by itself unusual, except for the qualification that I am a literary theorist 
and have a doctorate in Literature. I undertook this endeavor with the objective of 
attempting to understand the nature of scientific practice and how scientific exploration 
differs among scientists and humanists such as myself. For this paper for the first biennial 
conference of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice, I will show how 
pragmatic explanations of how science is conducted can be reconciled with the rational 
and positivist philosophies of science that seemed to have guided the scientific method in 
the laboratory. My explorations begin with, but will not be limited to, the theoretical 
basis offered by the actor-network theory and sociological explanations of scientific 
practice, and the practical considerations offered by my own professional experience in 
the laboratory.  
My scientific research concerns how genes are transcribed; the genes that I have been 
dealing with are the ones that control for expression of proteins that are involved in red 
blood cell production. I have had previous experience in the laboratory prior to my 
current one, however, only on a very limited basis. From this particular project, I gained 
enormous insight into how science is conducted in terms of how experiments are 
designed and executed, and how data is interpreted and disseminated. The models that I 
have developed in assessing these experimental elaborations are the subject of this paper. 
These models assist in understanding the nature of problem-solving in science, how 
methodologies in the laboratory are constructed and assimilated, and how scientific 
explanations are arrived at. These assessments are unique in that they are arrived at from 
the perspective of a literary theorist. Literary theory and postmodernism essentially guide 
the spirit of my reflections. Through these insights, I hope to mitigate many of the 
dichotomies that characterize interpretations of what scientific knowledge consists of. 
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UNDERSTANDING THEORIES IN PRACTICE: REPRESENTATIONAL AND 
COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS 
 
Marion Vorms 
IHPST 
 
In this paper, I construe scientific understanding not only as understanding the 
phenomena by means of some theoretical material (theory, law or model), but more 
fundamentally as understanding the theoretical material itself that is supposed to explain 
the phenomena. De Regt and Dieks (2005) emphasise the contextual aspects of the 
intelligibility of theories, showing that it depends on their ―virtues‖, on the historical 
standards of intelligibility, and on the particular ―skills‖of their users. My paper aims at 
continuing this proposal, first by giving a more precise definition of one‘s understanding 
of a theory and then by emphasising the importance, for this issue, of the particular 
formats in which a theory is expressed and hence grasped by its users. To defend this, I 
take the example of the versions of classical mechanics and the various formats of 
representation of its main principles and models. 
 
What does ―understanding a theory‖ mean? At first sight, we could say that it amounts to 
having a clear view of the logical relations between its core principles and theorems. This 
kind of understanding, though global, is quite abstract: one can understand the logical 
structure of a theory without being able to connect it to the phenomena. Moreover, this 
definition depends on how one construes the structure of theories: it will vary according 
to whether one defines theories as logical sets of statements with interpretative rules 
(following the ―syntactic conception‖ of theories) or as families of models (―semantic 
conception‖). I thus suggest that there is another sense of ―understanding a theory‖ that 
itself has two aspects. To understand a theory, one has to understand both what the theory 
says or means and how it works; in other words, one has to understand it as representing 
the phenomena (representational aspect) and to be able to manipulate it and make it fit 
the phenomena (computational aspect). 
 
I claim that these are essentially contextual and practical matters, and that the particular 
format in which the theoretical content is displayed is crucial to them. Following 
Humphreys‘ proposal (2004), I claim that one never accesses to a theory as a whole. Be it 
a set of statements or a class of models, in practice, it is always displayed in some 
particular equations, statements, images, graphs, diagrams. Humphreys‘ proposal of the 
notion of ―template‖ to complement the classical ―units of analysis‖ of science, like 
theories and models, may be a good candidate to study the relationship between the 
representational and computational aspects of understanding: a template is a ―concrete 
piece of syntax‖ (most of the time an equation, but I suggest that Humphreys‘ claim 
could be extended to other formats) that has both a representational and computational 
function. With the example of classical mechanics, I show how these two functions are 
interrelated and, as Humphreys suggests, are sometimes in tension with each other. 
Adressing these issues by focusing on the particular formats that are dealt with in practice 
may enlight this problematic relationship. 
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HOW VALUES INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF RISK ASSESMENTS – THE CASE 
OF TRANS FATTY ACIDS 
 
Birgitte Wandall 
Royal Institute of Technology 
 
Abstract: Scientific evidence plays an important role as a basis for health risk 
assessments. When a potential hazard is assessed it is done on basis of available 
evidence, which may consist of experimental studies on animals or of epidemiological 
data (or both). 
When scientific evidence is used in this way, it is often assumed that the outcome of the 
risk assessment will be a value-free assessment of facts. On this view, if different risk 
assessors reach diverging conclusions in an assessment of a potential hazard, the 
difference in conclusion must be due to either a mistake on the part of one of the risk 
assessors, or to one of them not having access to all relevant facts. 
In this paper, I compare two assessments of the influence of trans fatty acids on human 
health made by Danish Nutrition Council (1)and by the European Food Safety Authority 
(2), respectively. The two assessements were made at roughly the same time and the risk 
assessors  had access to the same evidence regarding the effects of trans fatty acids. In 
spite of this, there was considerable disagreement in conclusions and recommendations 
for risk reduction; one expert group recommended a severe reduction in the content of 
trans fatty acids allowed in foodstuffs for human consumption, while the other made no 
recommendations at all. 
Why did the conclusions differ so much? To find an answer to that question, I  have 
compared the two reports, looking for differences in what evidence was included and in 
how that evidence was interpreted. Surprisingly, I found that the two expert groups based 
their opinions on almost the same set of studies, and that they agreed very much in their 
interpretations of that evidence.   
It turned out that the differences in conclusions were due mainly to differences in what 
was perceived as an appropriate level of precaution when dealing with uncertainty and 
lack of data. It seemed that the Danish Nutrition Council was quite concerned with the 
risk of making a type II error (false negative): It was explicitly stated that a justified 
suspicion of adverse effects sufficed for a recommendation of risk reduction measures. 
The European Food Safety Authority on the other hand seemed much more wary of 
committing a type I error (false positive), even if this was not explicitly stated. 
The lessons that may be learned from this example are twofold:  
(a) What seems to be a disagreement on an empirical fact (―do trans fatty acids have 
negative influence on human health‖), may well turn out to be a disagreement on 
a much more normative issue (―how much evidence is needed before a 
recommendation for risk reduction should be given‖). 
(b) A norm that is well-established in basic science, such as the norm of trying to 
reduce the risk of type I errors, may not be equally unquestionable when put to 
use in an applied science, such as risk assessment. While it is not necessarily 
wrong to prioritise a reduction of type I errors even in risk assessment, it may be 
useful to consider the rationale behind the norm and its consequences in relation 
to the outcome of a particular risk assessment. 
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA OF THE IARC 
MONOGAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS 
 
Erik Weber 
Ghent University (UGent) 
 
In the Preamble to the IARC Monographs (http://monographs.iarc.fr) we read [1]:  
 
Through the Monographs programme, IARC seeks to identify the causes of 
human cancer. (p. 1)  
 
More specifically, the objective of the programme is ... 
 
... to prepare, with the help of international Working Groups of experts, and 
to publish in the form of Monographs, critical reviews and evaluations of 
evidence on the carcinogenicity of a wide range of human exposures. (p. 2) 
 
The exposures include individual chemicals but also ... 
 
... groups of related chemicals, complex mixtures, occupational exposures, 
physical and biological agents and lifestyle factors. (p. 1) 
 
How is the carcinogenic risk of exposures assessed? The available evidence is divided 
into epidemiological studies (field experiments with humans), animal experiments and 
information about mechanisms. The assessment consists of three phases. Only in the third 
phase, the different types of evidence are combined. In the first phase, each study (no 
matter what kind it is) is evaluated separately. In the second phase an assessment is made 
of the strength of the evidence for each group (epidemiological evidence, evidence from 
experimental animals, evidence from mechanisms). 
In my paper, I will analyse the procedures and criteria used by IARC (in the three phases) 
from the perspective of contemporary philosophical theories of causation. More 
specifically, I will argue that IARC procedures do not fully take into account the possible 
evidential role of causal mechanisms. I will propose some changes to the practice of 
IARC, which would improve the reliability of their results. 
 
[1] Quotations are from the version of January 2006 (the most recent one at this moment).
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THE PROBLEM OF BIAS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
 
Torsten Wilholt 
Bielefeld University 
 
Bias is more and more recognized as a serious problem in many areas of scientific 
research, especially in private research (e.g. drug testing) and in policy-related areas (e.g. 
climatology). But how exactly should one describe and define the phenomenon of bias, 
and characterize it as a shortcoming of the research in question? I will first propose a 
prima facie plausible characterization of bias in terms of inductive risk. In testing a 
hypothesis, a lower risk of committing a false positive error can often be traded off 
against a higher risk of committing a false negative (or vice versa), by altering problem 
selection, experimental design, data analysis or even one‘s practices of disseminating and 
publishing results. Bias can then be regarded as a researcher‘s failing to be impartial 
between the two kinds of risk, and allowing her different attitudes with regard to the 
desirability of a positive or negative result to influence the set-up of the test or even the 
whole research project. 
However, this analysis of bias faces a serious problem. From the times of C. West 
Churchman on, philosophers of science have again and again argued that there is no non-
arbitrary and convincing way to mark out any particular balance between the two types of 
inductive risk as the correct or ―impartial‖ one. Researchers who test hypotheses will 
always have to evaluate the consequences of errors in order to make their methodological 
choices. A researcher testing the toxicity of a food additive will and should strike a 
different balance between the two kinds of inductive risk than a scientist contributing 
another experimental probe to the ongoing discussion of some academic hypothesis.  
Against this background, it might seem that often (viz., in cases that don‘t involve 
outright deception), to speak of bias is merely to express one‘s disagreement with the 
particular kind of value-judgement concerning the consequences of error that must have 
been applied in the respective case. In a way, bias-talk would thus be revealed as 
involving the charge of a moral shortcoming rather than an epistemic one. However, one 
need not rest with this counter-intuitive conclusion.  
The solution, I will argue, is to consider scientific practices (as governed by 
methodological conventions) as some kind of social institutions. Standards of 
experimental design, data analysis, and the like, are often highly conventional. Such 
conventions often imply a certain balance between types of inductive risk and thereby an 
implicit evaluation of the consequences of error. They can differ from discipline to 
discipline and even from one type of research institution to another. They are 
nevertheless not arbitrary, because they serve the social purposes of organized science. 
Conventional standards in scientific research permit other actors to develop differentiated 
attitudes of trust towards different kinds of institutionally sanctioned scientific ―results‖. 
Bias often involves deviation from conventional standards and thereby disrupts this trust. 
Bias thus comes out as an epistemic inadequacy under the wider perspective of social 
epistemology.
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ATTENTION TO PRACTICE: REPRESENTATION IN MOLECULAR CHEMISTRY 
 
Andrea Woody 
University of Washington 
 
Many, perhaps most, contemporary philosophers of science would assert that 
considerations of scientific practice are relevant, and perhaps even crucial, for 
philosophical analysis.  Yet there is no developed, self-conscious discussion regarding to 
exactly what notion of practice we should appeal.  An adequate response no doubt 
depends upon both the particular philosophical project at hand and one‘s conception of 
philosophy of science generally.  The most general aim of this talk is to make explicit 
both the nature of the practice under investigation and the relation between this practice 
and general philosophical issues. 
My concern is with representational practices within chemistry, in particular 
mathematical, linguistic, diagrammatic, and material model representations of molecules.  
I contend the rather obvious point that our only means of understanding, and making 
intelligible, the diversity of representations in molecular chemistry comes through 
attention to practice properly described.  Less trivial is the task of articulating the right 
level of description, one that will allow us to grapple with the thoroughly normative 
nature of the questions we ask in philosophy of science. 
  From a certain vantage point, all molecular representations, regardless of format, are 
means of capturing and presenting theoretical claims.  A central concern of philosophy of 
science, arguably the central concern, has been how to determine the justificational status 
of theories: When should we accept theories?  When should we believe them?  Are these 
two questions actually one and the same?  How are theories connected to the world?  
What are the conditions for evidential relevance?  I will approach these general questions 
within the specific context of representational practices in molecular chemistry.  I will 
argue that in this context an epistemic distinction between acceptance and belief is both 
intelligible and necessary.  I will also argue that attention to representation as practice, 
rather than as artifact abstracted from practice, allows us to articulate certain conditions, 
involving utility, grounding a notion of rational theory acceptance. 
A presupposition of this entire line of reasoning is that we can usefully identify 
theoretical claims with the specific representational artifacts used to communicate them.  
To presuppose this, however, raises questions that fall outside traditional stomping 
grounds for philosophy of science (but well within the territory of analytic philosophy).  
These questions concern the ways in which theoretical representations are used by 
individuals and especially communities to enhance inferential capacities and make them 
more robust.  In essence, theories are no longer primarily, or merely, descriptive of 
aspects of the world but are tools used to reason about and engage with aspects of the 
world.  That theories so function is obvious; how they are able to perform this function is 
not at all obvious.  My discussion of molecular chemistry aims to demonstrate that 
grasping this functionality requires attention to particular characteristics of particular 
practices.
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WHAT KNOWERS KNOW WELL: STANDPOINT THEORY AS A RATIONALE 
FOR COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PRACTICE IN ARCHAEOLOGY 
 
Alison Wylie 
University of Washington 
 
Standpoint theory, I argue, is best understood as a framework for epistemic analysis that 
focuses attention on the social conditions—the composition and dynamics of epistemic 
communities—by which knowledge production and authorization can be systematically 
skewed: it is a theory of epistemic injustice (in Fricker‘s sense) and a concomitant theory 
of how we might improve epistemic practice given a robust appreciation of epistemic 
advantage that may accrue to those who are otherwise marginalized. So conceived, 
standpoint theory need not assume an essentialist, or falsely universalizing, conception of 
the social categories or collectivities—the social kinds—in terms of which standpoints 
are characterized, nor need it attribute to subdominant standpoints any categorical or 
automatic epistemic privilege. All it requires is that contingent lines of social 
differentiation be robust enough to make a systematic difference to what epistemic agents 
are likely to know, or know well. When such conditions obtain, standpoint theory is a 
useful framework for understanding consequential patterns of epistemic exclusion or 
marginalization, and pivotal shifts in understanding that can arise when insights from 
marginal standpoints throw into relief the partiality of a dominant world view.  
 
In this paper I draw on the resources of standpoint theory, so understood, to make sense 
of and to articulate a philosophical rationale for various forms of community based 
collaborative research that have been taking shape in, and that have been the focus of 
active methodological debate within, a range of social sciences. I focus on an unlikely 
site for CBPR practice—archaeological research undertaken in engagement with 
descendant communities—and compare the principles guiding collaborative practice in 
these contexts with those now well articulated by feminist advocates of participatory 
action research, by activist-scholars involved in community based ecological research, 
and in the sharply acrimonious debate about participatory development. While the 
motivation for these forms of practice is, appropriately, a set of commitments to social 
justice, its justification is as much epistemic as normative. Standpoint theory provides a 
framework for explaining how it is that research practice can be substantially enriched, 
empirically and conceptually, by extra-disciplinary collaboration. At the same time, the 
examples I consider put epistemically consequential pressure on the ideals of objectivity 
that underpin standpoint theory and some standard standpoint-inspired guidelines for 
doing (social) science.  
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VALUES IN ACTION: THE HWANG CASE OF STEM-CELL RESEARCH FRAUD 
 
Sang-Wook YI 
Hanyang University 
 
Scientists usually love to describe science as value-neutral, and Korean scientists are no 
exceptions. The recent scientific fraud case of Dr Hwang‘s stem-cell research team 
however raises a number of illuminating issues in science and value. In this paper, I 
discuss the Hwang Case and draw a few implications. 
 
First of all, I point out that the very ideal of value-neutral scientific research is a 
contradiction. Scientists have no choice but to make epistemic value-judgments all the 
time. They have to evaluate routinely the reliability of their experimental equipments, of 
their analysis methods, of their computer algorithms and so on. Also during their theory-
choice, scientists necessarily rely on a number of epistemic values such as simplicity, 
fruitfulness or explanatory power, and assess the relative merits of competing theories 
against another. In short, scientific research is a collection of thoroughly value-laden 
activities. 
 
Dr. Hwang always made it clear that his research is highly value-laden; it is for the 
welfare of people, or for the glory of Korean science (in consistent with his famous claim 
that scientists have nationality, though science itself does not). Korean scientists, who 
were mostly silent about Dr Hwang‘s value-laden claims when they were convenient for 
them, are now claiming that the very value-laden nature of Hwang‘s research was the 
source of the problem. Only if he and his team had done science properly (that is, in the 
value-neutral way), the shameful turmoil resulted from Hwang‘s scandal wouldn‘t have 
happened. They also extend their claims to the defects of government-driven science 
policy. Ultimately they are asking for more freedom in utilizing public fund for their 
‗pure‘ research. Interestingly, the civil opponents of Hwang‘s research also tends to think 
that the value-laden nature of Hwang‘s research such as ‗impure‘ connection with 
influential politicians was the essence of the problem, although they are asking for more 
public participation in the decision making process of science and technology policy. 
 
I argue that the Hwang case vividly shows how the intricacies of scientific research are 
highly value-laden in multi-dimensional ways; epistemologically, socially and 
institutionally. The problematic part of the Hwang case is not that he and his team did 
value-laden activities which are forbidden to scientists with integrity, but that their 
research practices and behaviors diverge significantly from their colleagues‘ value-laden, 
but well regulated research. In fact, neglecting the value-laden nature of scientific 
research has hindered tackling the problem of scientific fraud in South Korea. The 
parallel between the Baltimore case and the Hwang case is striking here. 
 
My broader conclusion is the following. An effective way to guard science from undue 
interferences or scientific fraud is to appreciate the fact that scientific research should be 
executed within the socially acceptable boundaries. The value-laden nature of scientific 
research is nothing to fear but to embrace. 
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SOCIAL MECHANISMS AND THE ILLUSION OF DEPTH OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
Petri Ylikoski 
University of Helsinki 
 
 
The idea of mechanistic explanation has become increasingly popular in the philosophy 
of the social sciences. The most visible advocates of mechanistic perspective have been 
social scientists inspired by rational choice theory (RCT) (Elster 1989, Hedström & 
Swedberg 1998). This paper will critically evaluate this approach from the point of view 
of explanatory practice. I argue that the highly abstract RCT accounts of social 
mechanisms have a tendency to produce a false sense of understanding. 
The illusion of depth of understanding (IDU) refers to the possibility that a person 
overestimate the detail, coherence, and depth of her understanding. I have earlier 
(Ylikoski 2007) argued theoretically that the IDU is not limited to everyday reasoning 
and that it is also a serious possibility in scientific cognition. This paper argues for the 
same conclusion by the way of case study. I argue that certain problematic features of 
RCT explanations make them especially prone to produce the IDU in social scientists. 
These features are not intrinsic to all RCT explanations, but they have an important role 
in current explanatory practices. The first problematic feature is the highly idealized and 
abstract nature of RCT explanations. This is not a big problem when the intended 
explananda are of the same abstract kind. However, when the explananda are concrete 
historical events the situation is different. Judging the relevance and sufficiency of the 
explanatory mechanism is extremely difficult in these circumstances. It is easy to fool 
oneself to think that one has captured ―the essence of the phenomenon‖. This illusion is 
further enhanced by the common practice of ―stylizing‖ of the facts to be explained. In 
practice, this means that the intended explanandum is never characterized independently 
of the suggested explanation. This makes it difficult to see the challenges the concrete 
facts could pose for the suggested RCT explanations and the theorist ends up working 
with ―theoretically interesting‖ cases that happen to fit to her explanatory resources. The 
second problematic feature is the lack of explicit standards for evaluating explanations. 
The RCT provides a malleable store of mechanisms that can be quite easily fitted to 
abstract characterizations of concrete situations. This creates a temptation for ad hoc 
mechanistic storytelling. Quite often these sketchy RCT narratives create a strong sense 
of understanding in people proposing them. As the standards of explanatory assessment 
are not made explicit (apart from the requirement that one should prove an explanatory 
mechanism), this feeling of understanding is often taken as sufficient criterion for the 
acceptance of the proposed explanation. Because the social mechanisms movement treats 
explanation as the central aim of social science, the explanatory success creates a sense of 
accomplishment that makes the checking of empirical details lose its urgency. As a 
consequence, the factual presuppositions of the explanatory account are often not 
properly checked. This lack of empirical challenge contributes to the persistence of the 
IDU in RCT theorists. 
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